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Abstract
Utilizing the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed among countries, we investigate
how public income shocks have different long run economic effects dependent on constitutional
arrangements. We find that (i) the so-called ‘resource curse’ is present in democratic presidential
countries—but not in democratic parliamentary countries, (ii) being parliamentary or presidential
matters more for the growth effects of natural resources than being democratic or autocratic, and
(iii) natural resources are more likely to reduce growth when proportional electoral systems are in
place than when the electoral systems are majoritarian. The two first effects is shown to be very
robust, the last effect less so.
Keywords: Growth, Political economy. Constitution. Resource curse. Institutions.
JEL: E61, F43, O13, P51, Q32
1. Introduction
Recent contributions to the political economy literature demonstrate systematic effects
of constitutional features, such as the electoral rules and the rules for legislation, on a
1We thank two anonymous referees and Co-Editor Lant Pritchett in JDE, Ragnar Torvik, Egil Matsen and
Kjetil Storesletten for valuable comments. In addition, we are grateful to participants in seminars at NTNU
(Trondheim), UiO (Oslo), NHH (Bergen) and EEA/ESEM (Vienna). Finally we thank Jeffrey Sachs, Andrew
Warner and Romain Wacziarg for providing us with data.
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wide range of economic policy outcomes (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini, henceforth
PT, 2003). Causal effects of constitutions on policies that are important for long run
economic performance have been harder to identify, and there are no evidence in the
literature of direct long run effects of constitutions.2 We suggest an indirect, reduced
form approach to test the long term effects of constitutional arrangements. Exploiting
the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed among countries provides us with
a quasi-natural experiment designed to measure and compare differences in performance
among countries with different types of constitutions. We argue that if economic policies
are determined by the constitutional arrangements we might expect countries with differ-
ent constitutional arrangements to react differently to exogenously determined income
shocks.
Using a cross-country sample of up to 90 countries from all continents, we empir-
ically investigate whether the constitutional features affect how natural resource abun-
dance affects economic growth. By including democracies as well as nondemocratic
regimes in the sample, we can separate the effects of democracy as such, from the effects
of constitutional form. We find strong evidence in favour of the hypothesis that constitu-
tions matter for the resource curse. The main point we make in this paper is illustrated
in Figure 1 and Figure 2 below. Figure 1and 2, indicate that presidential regimes suffer
from the resource curse but parliamentary regimes do not. In fact, we find that the overall
resource curse identified by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997a, 1997b, 2001), henceforth
SW, is mainly driven by presidential countries and nondemocratic regimes.3 In fact, the
particular forms of democracy matter even more than democratic rule in itself.
[Figure 1 and 2]
The patterns in Figure 1 and 2 survives a number of robustness checks, such as differ-
ent sample selections (e.g., inclusion/exclusion of non-democracies in the sample), inclu-
sion of geographical and colonial dummies, robust estimation procedures, inference from
different growth periods, using different model specifications, using different variables
for resource abundance and using instrumental variable methods. In the IV-estimation,
we follow Persson (2005) and use settler mortality to instrument for constitutional form.
Regarding electoral rules, we find suggestive evidence that countries with a proportional
electoral formula are more prone to the resource curse than are countries with a majori-
tarian voting rule.
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we briefly discuss the main findings of the liter-
ature on the economic effects of constitutions. This discussion will provide the basis for
the hypotheses we take to the data. After these preliminaries, we formulate an empirical
growth model in section 3. The empirical results are presented and discussed in section
4. Finally, in section 5, we sum up and conclude.
2Using within-country variation and instrumenting for constitutional features, Persson (2005) shows that
reforms from non-democracy or presidential democracy into parliamentary democracy leads to more growth
promoting trade and regulation policies. In turn, better "structural policies" has been shown to lead to higher
long term growth (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; replicated by Persson, 2005). The term
"structural policies" in the literature of Persson and Tabellini (PT, 2003; Persson 2005) loosely corresponds to
what Acemoglu et al., 2001 refer to as "economic institutions" e.g., trade and regulation policies. See Persson
(2005) for a further discussion.
3In some regressions, we include exactly the same countries as SW (1995, 1997a), in order to compare our
results with those of the previous literature.
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2. Natural resource abundance, institutional design and
economic performance
The literature on the resource curse seeks explanations to the paradoxical empirical pat-
tern that countries rich in natural resources seem to be outperformed, in the long run, by
countries with less, or even no, natural resources (SW, 1995; 1997a; 1997b; 2001).4 The
diverging experience of different countries has lead to an increasing focus on the impor-
tance of institutions. Significant interactions effects of institutional quality and natural
resource abundance on long-term economic performance have been established. How-
ever, using measures of institutional quality, as in Boschini et al., (2004) and in Mehlum
et al. (2006) is problematic for, at least two reasons. First, institutional performance indi-
cators are likely to be endogenous to growth, resulting in serious econometric problems
of simultaneity.5 Second, it is unclear which aspects of institutional performance that
are important for economic growth.6 We argue that investigating institutional design, as
opposed to measures of institutional performance, is a key to solving some of the prob-
lems in the resource curse literature.7 More importantly, the properties of constitutions
provides a foundation for a better understanding of which aspects of institutions that are
most essential to growth.
Why would we expect to observe interaction effects between institutional design and
natural resource abundance on economic growth? The remainder of this section propose
an intuitive and non-technical answer to this question. This will constitute the main
motivation of this paper, and provide the basis for the hypothesis that we take to the data.
Constitutional design is an important aspect of a country’s institutional arrangements,
and defines the formal rules of ‘the political game’. Two of the most fundamental sets of
rules are the rules for legislation and the electoral rules (PT, 2003). Different rules have
been found to translate into different policies. Presidential forms of government should
be associated with less rent extraction and lower levels of taxation than parliamentary
forms of government (Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997, 2000).8 The fear of govern-
4The seminal theoretical literature on the resource curse focuses on the structural mechanisms of the so-
called Dutch disease (see, e.g., Matsuyama, 1992; SW, 1999; Torvik, 2001). Subsequently, the rent-seeking
approach has gained increased attention (see, e.g., Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Torvik,
2002). In the rent seeking models, economic performance is hurt because rent-seeking behavior implies that
productive resources are allocated inefficiently. It now appears that there is little support for the Dutch disease
explanation, as it fails explain the diverging experience of different economies (Bulte et al., 2004; Auty, 2001).
This critique also applies for the rent-seeking literature, with the exception of Mehlum et al. (2006) who show
that the effect of natural resources on aggregate production may depend on the quality of institutions. The
findings in Mehlum et al. (2006) are supported by Boschini et al. (2004).
5The measures of institutional quality that are applied in the resource curse literature are subjective indi-
cators like Political Risk Services, Corruption Perceptions, and the World Bank Governance Indicators. Such
indexes are indeed likely to be endogenous to economic development.
6By instrumenting for institutional quality Boschini et al., (2004) propose a way around the first problem.
The second problem, however, remains unsolved.
7There are several reasons for this. First, the literature on the economic effect of constitutions shows that
institutional design is a significant determinant of institutional performance (PT, 2003). Second, institutional
designs rarely change, a property that political scientists often refer to as an "iron law". This property of
inertia is useful because it provides the analysis with a source of cross-country variation that is less sensitive to
economic performance.
8In Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997, 2000), the distinction between these forms of government centers
on the rules for legislative bargaining. The bargaining between different legislative coalitions, inherent in
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ment crises in parliamentary regimes creates strong incentives to maintain party disci-
pline and induce the government to pursue the joint interests of it’s voters, and thus cre-
ate broad spending programs (Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2000; Shugart and Carey,
1992; Huber, 1996). Presidential regimes, not being constrained by a confidence require-
ment, promote the allocation of spending to target powerful minorities within the con-
stituencies of powerful officeholders, at the expense of broad spending programs.9 Ma-
jority voting, combining small voting districts with plurality rule, tends to favor narrow
spending programs, and are often associated with smaller overall government spending
and taxes (PT, 2003).10
Persson (2005) argues that since constitutions do shape fiscal policy and other eco-
nomic and institutional features, they are likely to be reflected also in the structural poli-
cies fostering economic development, such as regulations to preserve property rights and
non-protectionistic trade policies. Hence, the specific political arrangements—the form
of democracy, rather than democracy per se—may be one of the missing links between
history, current policy and economic development. If structural policies are important
for economic development, one would expect these regulations to be more conductive
to growth when they apply to broad population groups rather than to small privileged
groups. Persson’s analysis suggests that introducing parliamentary democracy in a pre-
viously nondemocratic regime or, equivalently, in a presidential democracy, improves
structural policy so as to raise long-run productivity by almost 50%. At a minimum,
these estimates indicate that constitutional rules are systematically correlated with struc-
tural policies.
In addition, a growing body of literature investigates the relationship between consti-
tutional arrangements and corruption. Gerring and Thacker (2004) examine the impact
of territorial sovereignty (unitary or federal) and the composition of the executive (parlia-
mentary or presidential) on levels of perceived political corruption. They find evidence
indicating that parliamentary forms of government help reduce corruption. Kunicova and
Rose-Ackerman (2005) show that proportional representation (PR) systems are more sus-
ceptible to corrupt political rent seeking than are plurality systems. They also examine
the interaction between electoral rules and presidentialism, and find that PR systems,
particularly when combined with presidentialism, are associated with higher levels of
corrupt political rent seeking. Their results confirm PT’s basic findings that proportional
elections are associated with higher corruption levels, but contradict PT’s findings on
presidential systems.
Given these findings, it is reasonable to ask whether similar patterns can be found for
parliamentary democracies, is disciplined by the threat of a government crisis. As such a crisis would result in
the loss of valuable agenda-setting powers for the government, party discipline and stable legislative coalitions
are promoted. In a presidential system, the executive cannot be brought down by the legislator, but is directly
accountable to the voters. Thus, legislators have weaker incentives to stick together and vote on party or
coalition lines. These differences create larger overall and broader spending programs in parliamentary regimes
compared to presidential regimes.
9There is much more to the dynamics of this class of models than we have space for in this paper; PT
(2000, 2003) provide a detailed review of the literature of the economic effects of constitutions. PT (2003) also
present extensive empirical research on whether the theoretical predictions of the political economy literature
are supported by the data. For a brief overview of this literature’s main predictions and findings, see Persson
(2002).
10In Milesi-Ferretti et.al., (2002) the reason for this association is a smaller district size, whereas in Austen-
Smith (2000) the reason is plurality rule.
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the growth effect of the resource endowment. If the form of government and the elec-
toral system shape a country’s structural policies and level of corruption, it is plausible
that the same constitutional features also affect the way countries respond to resource
windfalls. A country’s resource endowment has important implications for politicians’
opportunities to design policy. A larger government budget provides politicians with
more resources which can be used to influence the outcome of elections. More resources
also raise the value of being in power, which in turn amplifies the political incentives to
distribute resources and political favors in an inefficient manner.
Mehlum et al. (2006) assert that the variance in growth performance of resource-rich
countries is primarily a result of how resource rents are distributed through institutional
arrangements. Given that different forms of government create different incentives for
distributing political favors, one would expect countries with different constitutions to
respond differently to resource booms. Based on the insights from the theoretical litera-
ture (that presidential systems favour powerful minorities and that structural programs in
parliamentary systems targets broader measures), and based on empirical evidence (sup-
porting the theoretical predictions of the constitutions literature, and providing evidence
of less corruption in parliamentary democracies), we would expect resource abundance to
be less damaging for long run economic performance in parliamentary democracies than
in presidential democracies. The subsequent sections provide evidence that this indeed
seems to be the case. In addition, we provide suggestive evidence indicating that electoral
systems matter. Natural resources are more likely to reduce growth under proportional
electoral rules than under majoritarian rules.11
3. Data and Econometric Model
We construct two data sets based on different data sources, one covering the period 1970–
1990, the second covering the period 1990–2000. Our 1970–1990 data set includes in-
formation on 90 countries.12 In this data set countries are classified as democratic or
nondemocratic regimes on the basis of the definition used by PT (2003). Countries with
an average value of less than 5 for the Gastil Index for the period 1972–1990 (corre-
sponding to "partly free", according to the Freedom House) are treated as democracies.13
We further separate our democracies into presidential democracies and parliamentary
democracies, and into majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. Our constitutional
variables are primarily borrowed from PT (2003) and Persson (2005). PT (2003) classify
regimes as presidential if the confidence of the assembly is not needed for the executive
to stay in power (even if an elected president is not the chief executive, or if there is no
11This last effect may suggest that the negative effects of proportional electoral rules on the level of cor-
ruption found by Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) dominate the prospective positive effects of favoring
representativeness (as opposed to the accountability, and hence the narrow spending programs, of majoritarian
systems) when interacted with resource abundance.
12These are the countries included in SW’s (1997a) main sample, with the exception of Hong Kong which is
not classified in the Gastil Index (a democracy index) for the whole sample period (1970-1990).
13For a precise definition, consult: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/>. Note, how-
ever, that all our main findings are robust to a narrower categorization (i.e., when countries with a Gastil Index
of < 3.5 are treated as democracies), although this respecification reduces the number of democracies in the
sample. Thus, the democracy threshold is not critical for our main results.
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elected president). On the basis of this definition, most semipresidential and premier-
presidential systems are classified as parliamentary regimes. PT (2003) classify regimes
as majoritarian if all of the lower house is elected under plurality rule. Only legislative
elections (for the lower house) are considered. Persson (2005) lists reform episodes—that
is, exits from and entries into different forms of democracy—for the period 1962-1998.
We combine these two sources in order to classify countries according to their form of
government and electoral system in 1970.14
Our 1990–2000 data set includes information on 61 democracies.15 This data set is
also separated into presidential regimes and parliamentary regimes, and into majoritarian
and proportional electoral systems. Our constitutional variables are identical to PT‘s
(2003) classification.16
To compare our findings with the influential contributions of SW, and in particular
SW (1995,1997a), we mainly use their model specification and control variables. SW
(2001) show that their previous results (1995, 1997a) are robust to conditioning on pre-
vious growth rates rather than levels. For simplicity, we condition on initial levels in
our specifications. Thus, we expect average (log of) economic growth in country i, be-
tween time t = 0 and t = T (in this case 1970–1990 or 1990–2000), 1t
(
yiT − yi0
)
, to be
determined to (the log of) initial income, yi0, and a vector of country specific structural
characteristics, Zi, as follows.
1
t
(
yiT − yi0
)
= α0 + α1yi0 + Z
iβ+ui (1)
SW (1995, 1997a) suggest that that initial natural resource abundance should be in-
cluded in Zi. Given the recent contributions in the political economy literature relating
structural (growth promoting) policies to different constitutional arrangements, we inves-
tigate whether constitutional features are incorporated in Zias well. More importantly,
however, we check whether there are any interaction effects between constitutional ar-
rangements and natural resource abundance. If constitutional arrangements affect struc-
tural policies, as predicted by the political economy literature, and structural policies
matter for how countries deal with natural resource wealth, one would expect to observe
such interaction effects in the data. Theory predicts presidential democracies to be as-
sociated with worse structural policies, in relation to growth, than parliamentary democ-
racies. Assuming that increased access to resources amplifies political incentives, we
expect presidential regimes with abundant natural resources to grow more slowly than re-
source abundant parliamentary regimes. Hence, in addition to the controls in SW’s most
robust specifications, we include constitutional dummies and their interaction with nat-
ural resource abundance. In particular, we include dummies for the form of government
(presidential versus parliamentary) and electoral rules (majoritarian versus proportional
electoral system). Finally, we control for geographic location (continent), colonial his-
tory, and the most robust significant determinants of growth according to Sala-i-Martin
14See Appendix A.1 - A.4 for details.
15To define democracy in the 1990–2000 data set, we rely on PT (2003). PT (2003) include a country as
democracy if the GASTIL score is lower than an average of 5 for the 1990–1998 period. This rule permits 85
countries to be classified as democracies in PT (2003). We are able to utilize 61 out of these 85 countries due
missing data on some of the relevant variables.
16See PT (2003) for a precise definition.
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(1997). In the 1990–2000 data set we construct variables using the same definitions as
SW (1997a), but for different time periods.
4. Results
4.1 The form of government
The group of parliamentary democracies comprises 33 countries, two of which are in the
top 10 percent of natural resource abundant countries and six of which are in the bottom
10 percent. The group of presidential democracies comprises 25 countries, two of which
are located in the top 10 percent of natural resource abundant countries and two of which
are in the bottom 10 percent. In our data set, initial resource abundance—measured
as the ratio of primary exports to GNI in 1970—ranges from 0.6% to 54%. We find all
regime types represented among both resource rich countries and resource poor countries.
Among the one-third of the countries with the most abundant natural resources, there are
6 parliamentary democracies, 9 presidential democracies and 15 nondemocratic regimes.
Among the one-third of the countries least abundant in natural resources, there are 18
parliamentary democracies, 7 presidential democracies and 5 nondemocratic regimes.
In the middle group, we find 9 parliamentary democracies, 9 presidential democracies
and 12 nondemocratic regimes. Thus, there seems to be sufficient variation in resource
abundance among all three categories of countries for statistical inference to be reliable.
To investigate whether the patterns found in Figure 1 and Figure 2 holds when con-
trolling for other factors that have been found to be important for growth, we use alter-
native model specifications. We begin by replicating the regression results of the main
model specification in SW (1997a).17 Table 1, column (1), replicates the results in SW
(1997a), without excluding outliers. Our results are consistent with those of SW re-
garding both convergence and the effects on growth of openness, the rule of law index,
investment and natural resource abundance. On average, countries that where abundant
in natural resources in 1970 experienced lower growth in the following two decades,
with an estimated coefficient of -8.17 and a t-statistic of -6.71. The cross-country mean
of natural resource abundance in our data is 0.13 with a standard deviation of 0.10.18 The
estimates in column (1) imply that a 10 percentage point increase—corresponding to an
increase of one standard deviation—in the ratio of exports of natural resources to GNI in
1970 is associated with a reduction in annual average growth the two following decades
of 0.82 percentage points (-8.17*0.10 = -0.82).
In column (2), we include dummies for the form of government, with the excluded
category being parliamentary democracy. Including controls for the type of government
(presidential democracy, parliamentary democracy and nondemocratic regime) does not
17SW exclude four outliers when estimating their main model specification. These countries are deemed
to be outliers according to the procedure suggested by Belsley et al., (1980). SW identify the four outliers,
regressing growth only on initial natural resource abundance and on the average degree of openness between
1970-1990. Note that the same countries will not necessarily be identified as outliers when additional controls
for constitutional classification and its interaction with natural resource abundance are included. To estimate
different specifications of the model consistently, we address the problem of possible outliers by applying
different robust estimation techniques (discussed below).
18Thus, on average, about 13 percent of the gross national income (GNI) of the countries in the sample stems
from exporting primary products.
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change the effects of convergence, openness, rule of law, investment and natural resource
abundance. However, presidential democracies are associated with lower growth than are
parliamentary democracies. So far, our estimates have added little to SW’s findings. Col-
umn (3), however, provides new insights into the resource curse. In this regression, we
include interaction terms between the form of government and resource abundance. The
direct effect of resource abundance is no longer statistically or economically significant.
This indicates that there is no significant resource curse in parliamentary democracies
(our excluded category). Not surprisingly, nondemocratic regimes abundant in natural
resources perform worse than resource abundant parliamentary democracies, with an
estimated interaction coefficient of -6.21 and a t-statistic of -1.98. However, more sur-
prisingly, the performance of natural resource abundant presidential democracies is even
worse.
Comparing natural resource abundant democracies, presidential democracies per-
form much worse than parliamentary democracies, with an estimated interaction coef-
ficient of -7.85 and a t-statistic of -2.69. Thus, among presidential democracies and non-
democratic regimes, higher natural resource abundance in 1970 is associated with lower
growth in the following two decades, whereas, for parliamentary democracies, higher
natural resource abundance in 1970 does not significantly affect subsequent growth. Fi-
nally, note that allowing interaction effects eliminate the separate effect of form of gov-
ernment on growth.
It is well known that the SW measure of resource abundance—primary exports di-
vided by GNI—has been criticized for being a measure of resource dependence, or in-
tensity, rather than resource abundance. In addition, one might question whether it is
absolute exogenous to growth. While natural resource endowments are randomly dis-
tributed among countries, the SW variable captures something broader. First, it measures
export rather than absolute quantities. Second, it measures resource abundance relative
to the size of the economy. One concern is that economies with institutions not conduc-
tive to growth will have lower income, and hence appear resource abundant according
to the SW measure. The focus of this paper is not to solve the problem of how to mea-
sure natural resources in growth regressions, but to show that different constitutional
arrangements can explain some of the heterogeneity in the effect of resource abundance
on growth. Nonetheless, to meet this critique, we replicate Table 1 with an alternative
resource measure. In Table A2, the resource abundance measure is "cleansed" from its
endogenous denominator by multiplying with GNI, and dividing by population. Hence,
the new resource measure captures export of primary products per capita (in 1970 current
US dollars). The results in Table A2 reveal the same pattern as Table 1, indicating that
our results are not driven by economic growth per se.19
In Table 2, nondemocratic regimes are excluded from the sample. Column (1) ex-
hibits the same qualitative results as in Table 1, regarding convergence, natural resource
abundance, openness, investment, the rule of law, and changes in the external terms
of trade. This indicates that the negative correlation between resource abundance and
growth also applies among democracies. As in Table 1, including controls for the form
19We have also used the value of oil per capita as our resource measure. This reveals a similar pattern
regarding the effect of natural resources on growth. The effect on growth from having oil, for parliamentary
democracies is positive, and the effect is negative for presidential democracies and nondemocracies, but the
results are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
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of government does not significantly change the estimated effects of any of the other
explanatory variables. In column (3), we include interaction terms between the form
of government and resource abundance. Again, the direct effect of resource abundance
is no longer significant, hence there is no resource curse in parliamentary democracies.
Among resource abundant democracies, presidential regimes perform much worse than
parliamentary regimes, with a highly significant estimated interaction coefficient of -8.02
(for which the level of significance is 0.7 percent).
One objection to our interpretation of the results, namely that the resource curse
seems to be determined by constitutional features, might be that constitutional classifi-
cations are merely proxies for geographic location and/or colonial history, which then
are the real determinants of the curse. For example, the widespread use of presidential-
ism in the Americas has led political scientists to dub the Americas as the continent of
presidentialism. We investigate this objection by including dummy variables for previ-
ous colonial rulers, continent and added interaction terms with resource abundance to
see if this can explain the diverging growth performance among resource rich countries.
Including these controls indicates that the resource curse occurs regardless of colonial
history and location (table not shown). In Table 3, we include additional controls to
check whether our previous findings are robust to the inclusion of dummies for previ-
ous colonial rule and continent. The patterns evident in Tables 1 and 2 are confirmed.
Presidential regimes suffer the most from being rich in natural resources, relative to both
parliamentary democracies and nondemocratic regimes.
Throughout the paper, the number of observations are limited by the rule of law index.
One could argue that the 73 countries that do not have missing values of the rule of law
index in our main regressions are not randomly selected, and that the statistical inference
is limited to these countries. In Table A3, we report versions of the main regressions
that include the average value of the Gastil Index rather than the rule of law index.20
This gives us a total sample of 90 countries. As shown in Table A3, replacing the rule
of law variable with the average value of the Gastil Index does not significantly affect
the qualitative results already obtained. In fact, the estimated interaction coefficients are
larger in absolute value in the extended sample. This confirms that there are statistically
significant differences in the way different constitutions respond to natural resources.
A potential limitation of OLS estimators in general is that they may be highly in-
fluenced by outliers located at leverage points. This limitation applies particularly in
small samples. To make sure that our results are not driven by outliers, we reran our
regressions by using two alternative estimation methods that are robust to the presence
of outliers. First, we used LAD regression, which is a special case of quantile regres-
sion, or more specifically, median regression (table not shown).21 Minimizing the sum
of absolute deviations makes the regression less sensitive to outliers than does minimiz-
ing the squared deviations. Thus, LAD estimates represent the bulk of the observations
better than OLS estimates, particularly in small samples. Second, we used a reweighted
least squares technique (table not shown). Reweighted least squares is recommended
20The correlation coefficient between the two variables is -0.72, which suggests that there is a reasonably
close relationship between democratic and institutional quality. Thus, democratic quality may serve as a (weak)
proxy for institutional quality, at least when data on institutional quality is not available.
21See, e.g., Greene (2003) for an introduction to LAD estimation and for a small sample Monte Carlo study
showing the advantages of LAD estimation over OLS in the presence of outliers.
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by Rosseeuw and Leroy (1987), among others. Under this procedure, OLS regression
is applied, gross outliers are excluded and, then, observations with large residuals are
iteratively downweighted.22 Outliers are dropped if Cook’s distance measure exceeds
unity. On this criterion, no outliers were dropped in our regressions. Both estimation
procedures suggest that outlying observations do not materially affect our results. The
estimated coefficients and their p-values are similar to the OLS estimates. If anything,
the effects appear stronger.23
In Figure 1, Mauritius and Malaysia appear to be important for the regression line.
One might be concerned if the conclusion about the resource curse not being present
in parliamentary democracies holds when these two countries are excluded from the re-
gressions. In Table A3 both these countries are included whereas in Table 1, 2 and 3
Mauritius is not included because of missing value on the rule of law variable. When
we drop these two potential outliers from Table A3, the coefficient of the direct effect
of resource abundance change from -1.76 to -5.89 in column (1) and from -1.88 to -5.82
in column (2). However, the effect remains insignificant at any conventional values. In
Figure 2 Guyana appear to be an outlier. Dropping Guyana from the regressions does
not change the insight that resource abundant presidential democracies perform worse
than resource abundant parliamentary democracies. The estimated interaction coefficient
change from -8.32 to -6.28 in column (1) and from -8.41 to -6,70 in column (2), and it
remains statistically significant.
Up to this point, our analysis suggests that different regime types generate different
growth effects of natural resource abundance. In particular, we have found that par-
liamentary democracies seem to respond differently to their resource endowments than
do other countries. For the whole sample, the variables for initial income, natural re-
source abundance, openness and the investment rate have the most explanatory power
for growth. A related question is whether the effects of these other variables also differ
systematically between parliamentary democracies and other regime types.24 In Table
4, we report the SW growth regression separately for parliamentary democracies and all
other countries to investigate whether parliamentary democracies respond differently to
the other explanatory variables, or whether the difference is primarily the growth effects
of resource abundance. Table 4 shows that the estimated coefficients on the initial in-
come level variable, the openness variable, the investment rate and the rule of law index
22This technique corresponds to the rreg command in STATA. The actual algorithm may be found in the
STATA (2003) manual.
23The quantile regression result indicate that the interaction term between pres and resource abundance is
-8.385, whereas the robust regression result indicate an interaction term of -8.637 (both statistically significant
at 1%). When only democracies are included, the interaction term ranges from -7.488 (quantile regression) to
-6.949 (robust regression), again significant at 1%. When interaction terms are included, the direct effect of
resource abundance do not turn out significant in neither the quantile or the robust regressions.
24The summary statistics in Table A1 indicate that the three forms of government have different average
values for the important determinants of growth. Initial income levels are higher in parliamentary democracies
than in the other two regimes. The overall sample mean for this variable is 8.31 with a standard deviation
of 0.90. This indicates that the deviation in the regime-type mean is less than one standard deviation of the
overall sample mean for all three categories. The measure of natural resource abundance is also lower in
parliamentary democracies than in the other two regime types. The overall sample mean of natural resource
abundance is 0.13 with a standard deviation of 0.10. Hence, the deviation in the regime-type mean is less
than one standard deviation of the overall sample mean for all three categories. Presidential democracies and
nondemocratic regimes are less open than parliamentary democracies and the investment rate is lower but,
again, the difference from the overall sample mean is less than one standard deviation.
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are within the same range when comparing parliamentary regimes to other countries.
There is some deviation in the estimated effect of the growth in the external terms of
trade. However, the main difference is in the estimated coefficient for the measure of
natural resource abundance.
4.2 Electoral Rules
We now consider electoral systems. Table 5 reports the same model specification as in
Tables 1 and 2, but compares different forms of electoral system. Columns (1) and (3)
show that differences between electoral systems—majoritarian democracy, proportional
democracy and no democracy—do not matter decisively for growth (note that propor-
tional electoral rule is the excluded category). Majoritarian electoral systems perform
better than proportional electoral systems with natural resources. The estimated inter-
action coefficient is 5.56 and the t-statistic is 1.99. However, majoritarian democracies
remain adversely affected by natural resources given that the direct effect exceeds the
additional effect of resource abundance, conditional on being a majoritarian democracy.
That is, the direct effect of -9.36 and the interaction effect of 5.56 combine to generate a
negative effect of -3.80. The same pattern is confirmed by including only democracies.
Among democracies, majoritarian electoral systems perform better when there are natu-
ral resources, with an estimated interaction coefficient of 8.40, which is significant at the
0.9 percent significance level. As shown in Table 6, including controls for colonial rule
and continental location does not change the qualitative results from Table 5.
Again we use LAD estimation and reweighted least squares to check the effect of
outliers on the results (tables not shown). The quantile regression results for the full
sample indicate that there is no significant difference in the growth effect of resource
abundance between different electoral systems. Among democracies, the interaction ef-
fect is statistically significant (at 0.3 percent). The robust regressions confirm the pattern
found in Table 5, but the estimated interaction coefficient (between majoritarian electoral
systems and resource abundance) is lower in magnitude and less significant than the OLS
estimates.
4.3 Additional robustness checks
Our results support the primary idea behind the paper, which is that the well-documented
systematic effects of constitutions on different measures of economic policy may also
extend to growth promoting policies (including measures of economic policy). However,
can we interpret the estimates as reflecting a causal mechanism? This requires that the
constitutional variables are exogenous with respect to economic performance. Although
barely any reforms altering the PT (2003) classification of forms of government have
occurred, this might not be sufficient for exogeneity. To deal with potential endogeneity
problems, whether they are due to reverse causality and/or omitted variables, we apply
an IV approach. As suggested by Persson (2005), we assume that Western colonization
affects current policies, and thereby growth, only through the form of political institu-
tions. Evidence of greater Western influence is consistent with observing the same type
of political arrangements in former colonies as those observed in Western Europe; i.e.,
parliamentary democracies. Suppose, in line with Acemoglu et al., (2001), that settler
41
mortality is a good measure of Western influence. Given the validity of the identifying
assumption that the influence on current policies operates only through the form of po-
litical institutions, settler mortality is a valid instrument for parliamentary democracy.
To be consistent with the rest of the paper, we define a new dummy variable, non_parl.
The non_parl dummy is equal to unity if the country is classified as either a presidential
regime or a nondemocratic regime and is equal to zero if the country is classified as a
parliamentary regime. We use settler mortality as an instrument for non_parl. To imple-
ment this method we apply Wooldridge’s approach to instrumentation of the endogenous
interaction terms by first predicting non_parl from the following regression.25
non−parl = α0 + α1lsettler + Ziβ+ui (2)
Then, we use the interaction term of the predicted variable and resource abundance
as an instrumental variable in the IV estimation. The results are reported in Table A4.
As expected a priori, the likelihood of parliamentary democracy increases with Western
influence, i.e., with lower values of settler mortality. Although there are data on settler
mortality for only 44 countries in our main data set, the results from these 44 countries
are similar to the OLS estimates in column 3. The difference between different forms
of government is no longer significant, but the pattern is the same as that implied by the
OLS estimates. The direct effect of initial resource abundance is neither economically
nor statistically significant. As before, this implies that parliamentary regimes seem free
of the resource curse. With only 44 countries, we have too few observations to further
distinguish between democracies and nondemocratic regimes. Since the sample size is
limited by the rule of law variable, one way of expanding the sample would be to use a
different measure of institutional quality. SW (1997b) use an institutional quality index
that is related to, but differs from, the rule of law index. This index is an unweighted
average of five indexes based on data from Political Risk Services and is available for
a larger number of countries than is the rule of law index. In columns (4) and (5) we
report IV estimates for democracies only, using the quality of institution variable rather
than the rule of law index. This provides a sample of 34 countries. In fact the estimated
interaction effect is larger when instrumented with settler mortality, compared with the
OLS estimates.
One concern, which applies to the empirical literature on economic growth in gen-
eral, is the basic concern of model specification. In particular, there is a significant
degree of uncertainty attached to identifying which variables are robustly related to
growth.26 Among the most influential contributions addressing this question is Sala-i-
Martin (1997). Sala-i-Martin choose a total of 62 variables from the growth literature
and test their correlation with the rate of economic growth. He choose three fixed vari-
ables (i.e., the variables that appear in all regressions) that are assumed to be "good"
a priori.27 These three variables include; level of income in the beginning of the pe-
riod, life expectancy and the primary school enrollment rate. Sala-i-Martin finds that 22
25See Wooldridge (2002), Chapters 9 and 18.
26Levine and Renelt (1992) is the first contribution in the growth literature that systematically address this
question. They do so by applying Leamer’s (1985) extreme-bounds test to identify robust empirical relations
in the growth literature.
27By this he mean that they have to be widely used in the literature, they have to be variables evaluated in
the beginning of the period to avoid endogenity, and they have to be variables that are somewhat "robust" in
the sense that they systematically seem to matter in all regressions run in the previous literature (Sala-i-Martin,
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out of the remaining 59 tested variables appear to be significantly related to growth.28
The most "significant" variables include: regional variables; political variables; religious
variables; variables describing market distortions and market performance; variables for
types of investment; primary sector production variables; openness; type of economic
organization; and former Spanish colonies. Table 7, 8 and 9 reports the results when we
include the variables that emerges as the most robust correlates of growth according to
Sala-i-Martin (1997).29 As reported in the tables, we observe the exact same pattern as
before, regarding the effects of natural resource abundance, constitutional forms and the
interaction effects: on average there seems to be a resource curse; form of government
and electoral rule is not significantly related to growth; presidential regimes and regimes
with a proportional electoral rule which are abundant in natural resources performs sig-
nificantly worse in the long run (1970-1990) than their resource-abundant counterparts.30
Up to this point, we have investigated the heterogeneity in the long-term effects of re-
source abundance, by contrasting form of government and electoral systems. Of course,
each form of government is combined with an electoral system. We now subdivide our
constitutional classification into four separate groups to combine electoral systems and
form of government (parl_maj, parl_prop, pres_maj, pres_prop) and interact them with
resource abundance. The results are displayed in Table 10. Column (1) include the
SW (1997) controls whereas Column (2) include the Sala-i-Martin (1997) controls. As
seen from Table 10, the direct effect of resource abundance is not statistically significant
(the excluded category being parl_maj).31 Resource abundant presidential democracies
with proportional electoral systems do worse than their resource abundant counterparts.
The estimated effect of the interaction term between pres_prop and resource abundance
ranges between -11.28 and -9.08 and is statistically significant at the 5% level.32
The final concern we address is that our findings may rely on the specific dataset, and
in particular on whether the patterns are evident also in more recent periods of growth.
Tables 11-13 report the regression results of our main model specification for the growth
period 1990-2000.33 We find evidence for the same patterns concerning the growth in-
teractions of constitutions and natural resources as in the 1970-1990 regressions. There
is no evidence of a resource curse in parliamentary regimes (Table 11, column 3) and
in regimes with majoritarian elections (Table 12, column 2). Presidential regimes and
regimes with proportional electoral rules initially endowed with abundant natural re-
sources, on the other hand, experience lower growth on average in the subsequent decade,
1990-2000. In the regressions reported in Table 13 (column 2), we reproduce the re-
(1997).
28See Sala-i-Martin (1997) for method and specification.
29The Sala-i-Martin (1997) data is available at http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/data.htm.
30Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) find that the strongest evidence for growth is for the relative price of in-
vestments, primary school enrollment and the initial level of GDP per capita. Including the relative price of
investment do not significantly change our results.
31When the three constitutional dummies are included (but not their interactions with resource abundance),
the direct effect of resource abundance ranges between -7.35 and -3.70 (significant at the 1% level with the
SW(1997) controls, and significant at the 10% level with the Sala-i-Martin (1997) controls.
32As in the previous specifications, the constitutional dummies turn out statistically insignificant when inter-
action terms between the constitutional variables and resource abundance are not included.
33As the SW dataset does not contain many of the variables required in the 1990’s regressions, these had to
be constructed. The data have been constructed in a similar way as possible to the SW data, in order to compare
all our results. See Appendix A.3 for a precise definition of variables.
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sults for the 1970-1990 sample (Table 10), that the worst combination of constitutional
regimes, when it comes to attracting the resource curse, is the combination of a presiden-
tial form of government and a proportional electoral system.
5. Conclusion
The empirical results of this paper suggest that economies’ long-run abilities to deal with
natural resource abundance depend largely on country specific constitutional arrange-
ments. We find that the form of government seems to matter more than being nondemo-
cratic in relation to whether a country is afflicted by the so-called resource curse. Revis-
iting the seminal growth analysis of Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997a), we find that the
resource curse is explained by the poor performance of resource abundant presidential
and nondemocratic regimes—there is no resource curse in democracies with a parlia-
mentary form of government. This empirical finding is consistent with recent contribu-
tions to the political economy literature, which suggests that presidential regimes pursue
inferior growth-promoting structural policies compared with parliamentary regimes. In-
terestingly, constitutions do not significantly affect growth directly, they simply have a
negative interaction with resource abundance. We tentatively interpret this result as a
budget constraint effect—the negative growth dynamics of presidential regimes, through
inappropriate structural policies, seem to play a quantitatively significant role only when
governments face a less rigid budget constraints. We also find patterns in the data sug-
gesting that the electoral system may matter for the resource curse. Proportional electoral
systems seem more likely to be afflicted by the resource curse. However, these effects
are empirically less robust than the effects of the form of government.
Although our results seem fairly robust, there is always the concern of omitted vari-
ables in cross-country regressions. The concern that our results reflect the influence of
variables not included in the regressions affecting both growth, constitutional arrange-
ments and primary resource export, calls for panel fixed-effect estimation. The constitu-
tional classification we focus on in this paper does not have enough constitutional time
variation for meaningful estimates from fixed-effect. Future empirical research should
try to solve this issue by, e.g., focusing on different constitutional aspects or exploiting
the new wave of democracies in the eastern Europe. There is also the possible problem
of endogeneity, that resource endowments determine institutions and, possibly, constitu-
tions. Some researchers (see, e.g., Sokoloff and Engerman (2000)) discuss the possibility
that initial factor conditions could have had profound and enduring impacts on long-run
paths of institutional and economic development. Future work should seek ways to deal
with this possibility in empirical work. In addition, the underlying mechanisms are un-
clear and require future research. In particular, theory should be developed to distinguish
different potential interactions between natural resource abundance and different dimen-
sions of a country’s political institution.
44
References
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson (2001), "The Colonial Origins of Compar-
ative Development: An Empirical Investigation", American Economic Review 91, pp.
1369–1401.
Austen-Smith, D. (2000), "Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation",
Journal of Political Economy 108, pp. 1235–1269.
Auty, R.M. (2001), Resource Abundance and Economic Development, Oxford University
Press, Oxford .
Belsley , D.A., Kuh, E and R.E. Welsch (1980), Regression Diagnostics. New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1980.
Boschini, A.D., J. Pettersson, and J. Roine (2004), "Resource Curse or Not: A Question
of Appropriability", Working Paper, Department of Economics, Stockholm University.
Bulte, E.H., R. Demania, and R.T. Deacon (2004), "Resource Abundance, Poverty and
Development", ESA Working Paper No. 04-03.
Demania, R. and E. Bulte (2003), "Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the
Natural Resource Curse", CiES Discussion Paper No. 0320.
Gerring, J and S.C. Thacker (2004), "Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role of
Unitarism and Parliamentarism", British Journal of Political Science 34, pp. 295–330.
Greene, W. (2003), Econometric Analysis, 5th Edition, Prentice Hall.
Hall, R. and C. Jones (1999), "Why Do Some Countries Produce so Much More Output
Per Worker than Others?", Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, pp. 83–116.
Heston, A., R. Summers and B. Aten (2002), Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002.
Huber, J. (1996), "The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies", American
Political Science Review 90, pp. 269–282.
Kaufmann, D. A. Kraay, and M: Mastruzzi, "Governance Matters IV: Governance Indi-
cators for 1996-2004" World Bank Group Working paper, May 2005.
Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1995), "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-country
Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures", Economics and Politics 7, pp. 207–227.
Kunicova, J. and S. Rose-Ackerman (2005), "Electoral Rules and Constitutional Struc-
tures as Constraints on Corruption", British Journal of Political Science 35, pp. 573–606.
45
Lane, P.R. and A. Tornell (1996), "Power, Growth and the Voracity Effect", Journal of
Economic Growth 1, pp. 213–241.
Leamer, E. (1985), "Sensitivity AnalysesWould Help", American Economic Review, Vol.
57, n3, pp. 308-313.
Levine, R. and D. Renelt (1992), "A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Re-
gressions", American Economic Review, Vol. 82, n4, pp. 942-963.
Matsuyama, K. (1992), "Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage and Eco-
nomic Growth", Journal of Economic Theory 58, pp. 317–334.
Mehlum, H., K.O. Moene and R. Torvik (2006), "Institutions and the Resource Curse",
The Economic Journal 116, pp. 1–20.
Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., R. Perotti and M. Rostagno (2002), "Electoral Systems and the
Composition of Public Spending", Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, pp. 609–657.
Persson, T., G. Roland and G. Tabellini. (1997), "Separation of Powers and Political
Accountability", Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, pp. 1163–1202.
Persson, T., G. Roland and G. Tabellini (2000), "Comparative Politics and Public Fi-
nance", Journal of Political Economy 108, pp. 1121–1141.
Persson, T. (2002), "Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?", Econometrica
70, pp. 883–905.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000), Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy,
Cambridge MA, MIT Press.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2003), The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What Do the
Data Say?, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Persson, T. (2005), "Forms of Democracy, Policy and Economic Development", NBER
Working Paper No. 11171.
Robinson, J.A., R. Torvik and T. Verdier (2002), "Political Foundations of the Resource
Curse", CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3422.
Rosseeuw, P.J. and A.M. Leroy (1987), Robust Regression and Outlier Detection, John
Wiley, New York.
Sachs, J.D. and A.M.Warner (1995), "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth",
NBER Working Paper No. 5398.
Sachs, J.D. and A.M. Warner (1997a), "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic
Growth" – revised version, Mimeo, Harvard University.
46
Sachs, J.D. and A.M. Warner (1997b), "Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies",
Journal of African Economies 6, pp. 335–376.
Sachs, J.D. and A.M. Warner (1999), "The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and
Growth", Journal of Development Economics 59, pp. 43–76.
Sachs, J.D. and A.M. Warner (2001), "The Curse of Natural Resources", European Eco-
nomic Review 45, pp. 827–838.
Sala-i-Martin, X. (1997), "I Just Run Two Million Regressions" American Economic
Review, Vol. 87, n.2, pp. 178-183.
Sala-I-Martin , G. Doppelhofer and R. I. Miller (2004), "Determinants of Long-Term
Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach" American
Economic Review, Vol. 94, n4, pp.813-835
Shugart, M. and J. Carey (1992), Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and
Electoral Dynamics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sokoloff, K.L. and S.L. Engerman (2000), "Institutions, Factor Endowments, and the
Paths of Development in the New World", Journal of Economic Perspective 14, pp.217-
232.
Tornell, A. and P.R. Lane (1999), "The Voracity Effect", American Economic Review 89,
pp. 22–46.
Torvik, R. (2001), "Learning by Doing and the Dutch Disease", European Economic
Review 45, pp. 285–306.
Torvik, R. (2002), "Natural Resources, Rent Seeking and Welfare", Journal of Develop-
ment Economics 76, pp. 455–470.
Wacziarg, R. (1996), "Information to Create Colonization Dummies", Harvard Univer-
sity, Cambridge, MA. Mimeograph.
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT
Press (2002).
47
A.1 Data appendix 1970-1990 sample
Using our definition of democracy we identify 58 countries as democracies. Some of
these countries are not classified according to their constitutional form by PT (2003) or
Persson (2005). These countries are Egypt, Morocco and Nigeria. In order to classify
these countries according to their form of government we rely primarily on the SYSTEM
variables in the World Bank DPI data set. The SYSTEM variable classifies countries as
either Parliamentary, Assembly-elected President or Presidential systems. Systems with
unelected executives, those scoring 2 or 3 on the Executive Index of Political Competi-
tiveness, are classified as presidential. The Executive Index of Political Competitiveness
scale is defined as follows:
1 if no legislature;
2 if unelected legislature;
3 if elected, one candidate;
4 if one party, multiple candidates;
5 if multiple parties are legal but only one party won seats;
6 if multiple parties did win seats but the largest party received more than 75 percent
of the seats;
7 if largest party got less than 75 percent of the seats.
Systems with presidents who are elected directly or by an electoral college (whose
only function is to elect the president), in cases where there is no prime minister, are
also classified as presidential. In systems with both a prime minister and a president, the
following factors are used to categorize the system:
a) Veto power: president can veto legislation and the parliament needs a supermajor-
ity to override the veto;
b) Appoint prime minister: president can appoint and dismiss the prime minister
and/or other ministers;
c) Dissolve parliament: president can dissolve parliament and call for new elections;
d) Mentioning in sources: If the sources mention the president more often than the
PM then this serves as an additional indicator to call the system presidential;
The system is presidential if (a) is true, or if (b) and (c) are true. If there is no
information or ambiguous information on (a), (b), (c), then (d) applies.
Countries in which the legislature elects the chief executive are parliamentary, with
the following exception: if that assembly or group cannot easily recall the president (if it
needs a two-thirds majority to impeach, or must dissolve itself while forcing the president
out) then the system is classified as an assembly-elected presidential system.
Two of the countries not classified by PT (Morocco and Nigeria) are classified as
"presidential" according to the SYSTEM variable, and we classify these countries as pres-
idential (pres = 1) in our data, as this closely corresponds to the definition used by PT.
Egypt is categorized as having a "strong president elected by assembly" according to the
SYSTEM variable. Egypt is categorized as parliamentary (pres = 0) in our data set be-
cause the assembly may recall the chief executive, either by a two-third majority or by
dissolving itself; thus the chief executive is subject to a confidence requirement.
We use the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (1997)
to classify countries according to their electoral systems, and use the same approach as
PT (2003). According to this definition, Morocco is classified as having a proportional
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electoral system (maj = 0), and Egypt and Nigeria are classified as having majoritarian
electoral systems (maj = 1).
A.2 Variable definitions, 1970-1990 Sample
africa
Geographic binary indicator for Africa. Source: Wacziarg (1996).
asiae
Geographic binary indicator for (East) Asia. Source: Wacziarg (1996).
avgastil7290
Average of indexes for civil liberties and political rights for the period 1972–1990, with
each index measured on a 1 to 7 scale, which 1 represents the highest degree of free-
dom and 7 the lowest. Countries with combined averages for political rights and civil
liberties score between 1.0 and 2.5 are classified as "free"; those scoring between 3.0 and
5.5 are "partly free"; and those that score between 5.5 and 7.0 are "not free". Source:
Freedom House, Annual Survey of Freedom Country Ratings. For a precise definition,
see http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/
change in tot
Average annual growth in the log of the external terms of trade between 1970 and 1990.
The external terms of trade is the ratio of an export price index to an import price index.
Source: SW (1997a).
civlibb
Index of civil liberties. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
col_esp, col_uk and col_oth
Binary indicators for British, Spanish and Other colonizers. Source: Wacziarg (1996).
confuc
Fraction of Confucius. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
dem
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the average of indexes for civil liberties and political
rights for the period 1972–1990 is lower than 5 (corresponding to the definition "partly
free" based on ratings for 2003). Dem = 1 if avgastil7290 < 5, and is 0 otherwise.
dem_maj
Dummy variable for electoral system, equal to 1 if the country was classified as having
a majoritarian electoral system in 1970 (conditional on the country being a democracy),
and 0 otherwise. Source: PT (2003); Persson (2005); International Institute for Democ-
racy and Electoral Assistance (1997).
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dem_maj_ra
Interaction term between dem_maj and resource abundance (resource abundance from
SW, 1997a).
dem_parl
Dummy variable for forms of government, equal to 1 if the county was non classified as
a presidential regime in 1970 (conditional that the country is classified as democracy),
and 0 otherwise. Source: PT (2003), Shugart and Carey (1992), World Bank DPI data
set, and national sources.
dem_parl_ra
Interaction term between dem_parl and resource abundance (resource abundance from
SW 1997a).
dem_pres
Dummy variable for forms of government, equal to 1 if the county was classified as a
presidential regime in 1970 (conditional on the country being a democracy), and 0 oth-
erwise. Only regimes in which the confidence of the assembly is not necessary for the
executive (even if an elected president is not chief executive, or if there is no elected presi-
dent) are classified presidential regimes. Most semi-presidential and premier-presidential
systems are classified as parliamentary. Source: PT (2003), Shugart and Carey (1992),
World Bank DPI data set, and national sources.
dem_pres_ra
Interaction term between dem_pres and resource abundance (resource abundance from
SW 1997a).
dem_prop
Dummy variable for electoral system, equal to 1 if the country was classified as not hav-
ing majoritarian electoral system in 1970 (conditional that the country is classified as
democracy), and 0 otherwise. Source: PT (2003), Persson (2005), International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (1997).
dem_prop_ra
Interaction term between dem_prop and resource abundance (resource abundance from
SW 1997a).
ecorg
Degree of capitalism. Index of degree in which economies favor capitalist form of pro-
duction. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
eqinv
Equipment investment. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
growth7090
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Average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active population be-
tween the 1970 and 1990. Source: SW (1997a).
initial income70
Natural log of real GDP divided by the economically-active population in 1970. Source:
SW (1997a).
institutional quality
An unweighted average of five indexes based on data from Political Risk Services. Source:
SW (1997b).
invest7089
The logarithm of average investment to GDP ratio during the two decades. Source: SW
(1997a).
laam
Geographic binary indicator for Latin America. Source: Wacziarg (1996).
lifee
Life Expectancy 1960. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
mining
Fraction of GDP in Mining. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
muslim
Fraction of Muslim. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
non_dem
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the average of the indexes for civil liberties and political
rights for the period 1972–1990 is higher than or equal to 5 (corresponding to the def-
inition "not free", based on ratings for 2003). non_dem = 1 if avgastil7290 = 5, and 0
otherwise.
non_dem_ra
Interaction term between non_dem and resource abundance (resource abundance from
SW 1997a).
non _parl
Dummy variable for form of government, equal to 1 if the country is classified as non
democracy or a presidential democracy, and 0 if the country is classified as a parliamen-
tary democracy. Source: PT (2003), Shugart and Carey (1992), World Bank DPI data
set, and national sources.
openness
Openness variable measuring the fraction of years between 1970 and 1990 that the coun-
try was integrated in the global economy. A country is integrated during a particular year
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if it maintained reasonably low tariffs and quotas, and did not have an excessively high
black market exchange rate premium. Source: SW (1997a).
prot
Fraction of Protestant. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
rerd
Exchange Rate Distortions. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
resource abundance70
Share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1970. Primary products or natural re-
source exports are exports of "fuels" and "non-fuel primary products" from the World
Data 1995 CD-ROM disk, produced by the World Bank. Non-fuel primary products
correspond to SITC categories 0, 1, 2, 4 and 68. Fuels correspond to SITC category 3.
Source: SW (1997a).
resource abundance per capita
Share of exports of primary products per capita 1970. The calculation is resource abun-
dance70 times GNI in 1970 (formerly GNP), divided by population in 1970. Data are in
current U.S. dollars. Source: GNI data are from World Development Indicators, Popula-
tion data from PWT.
rule of law
The variable "reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to ac-
cept the established institutions to make and implements laws and adjudicate disputes".
Ranges from 0 (low) to 6 (high). Measured as of 1982. Source: SW (1997a).
safrica
Sub-Sahara African Dummy. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
spain
Dummy variable for former Spanish colonies. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
school enrollment
Primary School Enrollment 1960. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
settler mortality
Log of mortality rate among non-military settlers in Western European colonies in the
early 1800s. Source: Acemoglu et al. (2001).
A.3 Variable definitions, 1990-2000 Sample
GROWTH9000
Average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active population be-
tween the 1990 and 2000. Exact calculation is
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100*(1/10)*ln(GDPEA00/GDPEA90).
LGDPEA90
Natural log of real GDP divided by the economically-active population in 1990. The Real
GDP data correspond to the series RGDPCH from the PennWorld Tables Version 6.1 (see
Heston, Summers and Aten 2002), and are in 1996 Constant Prices. The economically
active population is defined as the number of people between the ages 15-64. The source
for the population data is World Development Indicators database. Since the World Bank
population data is given as percentage shares of total population, and the real gdp data is
given in per-capita terms, the actual calculation is
ln(RGDPCH90*(100/pop15-64)). Note: This is the same calculation as SW (1997a).
LINVEST9099
Natural log of the ratio of real gross domestic investment to real GDP, averaged over the
period 1990-1999. Penn World Tables Version 6.1
MAJ
Dummy variable for electoral system, equal to 1 if all the lower house in a country is
elected under plurality rule, 0 otherwise. See PT (2003) for definition.
MAJ_RA
Interaction term betweenMAJ and RESOURCE ABUNDANCE.
PARL_PROP
Dummy variable. (1-PRES)*(1-MAJ)
PRES
Dummy variable for forms of government, equal to 1 in presidential regimes, 0 other-
wise. See PT (2003) for definition.
PRES_MAJ
Dummy variable. PRES * MAJ.
PRES_PROP
Dummy variable. PRES *(1-MAJ)
PRES_RA
Interaction term between PRES and RESOURCE ABUNDANCE.
RESOURCE ABUNDANCE80
Share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1980. Primary products or natural re-
source exports are exports of "fuels" and "non-fuel primary products" from the World
Data 1995 CD-ROM disk, produced by the World Bank. Non-fuel primary products
correspond to SITC categories 0, 1, 2, 4 and 68. Fuels correspond to SITC category 3.
Source: SW (1997a).
53
RULE OF LAW
Point estimate of "Rule of Law", the fifth cluster of Kaufmann et al. (2005) governance
indicators, measured in 1996. The indicator measure the quality of contract enforcement,
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Ranges from
-2.5 to 2.5 (higher values correspond to better outcomes). Source: Kaufmann et al.
(2005). The data, as well as a web-based graphical interface, are available at:
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/. The Appendices and a synthesis of the
paper are available at:
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4.html.
YEARSOPEN
Index for openness to international trade in a country, complied by SW (1995), measuring
the fraction of years during 1950-1994 that the economy in the country has been open.
Ranges between 0 and 1. Source: PT (2003).
A.4 Countries included in our data set, and their constitu-
tional classification
1970-1990 Data Set
Maj Prop
Pres Cyprus, Gambia, Nigeria, Pakistan Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Philippines, U.S.A Columbia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Rep., Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras,
Parl Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Egypt, France, India, Jamaica, Finland, Germany West, Greece,
Japan, Malaysia, Mauritius, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Singapore, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Sweden, Taiwan, Turkey,
Trinidad&Tobago, U.K
Non Democracies
Algeria, Ghana, Benin, Indonesia, Burkina Faso, Iran, Burundi, Cameroon,
Central African Rep. Ivory Coast, Chad, Chile, China, Jordan, Kenya, Congo,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Gabon, Syria, Paraguay, Togo, Tunisia,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda, South Africa, Zambia, Sudan, Zimbabwe
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1990-2000 Data Set
Maj Prop
Pres Chile, Gambia, Malawi, Pakistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Philippines, Uganda, USA, Zimbawe Columbia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Rep., Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Korea Rep., Mexico,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru,
Sri Lanka, Switzerland,
Uruguay, Venezuela
Parl Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Canada, Egypt, France, India, Finland, Germany, Greece,
Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Mauritius, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Nepal,New Zealand, Thailand, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Trinidad&Tobago, U.K Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey,
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Figure 1: Growth 1970-1990. Parliamentary Democracies
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Figure 2: Growth 1970-1990 Presidential Democracies
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Table 1: Growth 1970-1990. Form of government and interactions with resource abun-
dance. All countries included.
(1) (2) (3)
initial income70 -1.776 -1.79 -1.781
(0.206)*** (0.217)*** (0.209)***
resource abundance70 -8.167 -7.952 -2.836
(1.217)*** (1.246)*** (2.258)
openness 1.534 1.329 1.244
(0.388)*** (0.399)*** (0.389)***
invest7089 0.867 0.993 1.064
(0.316)*** (0.320)*** (0.309)***
rule of law 0.383 0.333 0.315
(0.103)*** (0.106)*** (0.108)***
change in tot 0.117 0.113 0.100
(0.045)** (0.047)** (0.045)**
dem_pres -0.57 0.131
(0.310)* (0.399)
non_dem -0.452 0.112
(0.370) (0.568)
dem_pres_ra -7.854
(2.925)***
non_dem_ra -6.205
(3.139)*
Constant 13.067 13.337 12.774
(1.590)*** (1.716)*** (1.663)***
Observations 73 73 73
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.73 0.76
NOTE: Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active population between 1970
and 1990 (growth7090). See Appendix A.2 for a precise definition of variables. The numbers in parentheses are standard
errors. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2: Growth 1970-1990 with form of government and interactions with resource
abundance. Only democracies included.
(1) (2) (3)
initial income70 -1.922 -1.906 -1.87
(0.270)*** (0.264)*** (0.246)***
resource abundance70 -7.299 -7.214 -2.645
(1.635)*** (1.593)*** (2.199)
openness 1.475 1.186 1.123
(0.477)*** (0.490)** (0.458)**
invest7089 0.838 1.058 1.194
(0.416)** (0.421)** (0.396)***
rule of law 0.458 0.397 0.342
(0.135)*** (0.135)*** (0.128)**
change in tot 0.038 0.041 0.035
(0.072) (0.070) (0.065)
dem_pres -0.601 0.111
(0.319)* (0.390)
dem_pres_ra -8.022
(2.843)***
Constant 14.08 13.915 13.114
(2.109)*** (2.057)*** (1.941)***
Observations 55 55 55
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.74 0.77
NOTE: Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active population between 1970
and 1990 (growth7090). See Appendix A.2 at for a precise definition of variables. The numbers in parentheses are standard
errors. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Growth 1970-1990. Parliamentary democracies and all other countries estimated
separately
Parliamentary dem. All other countries
(1) (2)
initial income70 -1.871 -1.830
(0.301)*** (0.268)***
resource abundance70 -3.586 -9.730
(2.215) (1.543)***
openness 1.267 1.218
(0.592)** (0.552)**
invest7089 1.121 0.938
(0.434)** (0.445)**
rule of law 0.300 0.341
(0.152)* (0.146)**
change in tot 0.323 0.102
(0.184)* (0.051)*
Constant 13.592 13.578
(2.338)*** (2.073)***
Observations 32 41
Adjusted R-squared 0.66 0.72
Note: Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active population
between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090). See Appendix A.2 for a precise definition of variables. The numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 6: Growth 1970-1990. Electoral system and interactions with resource abundance.
Controlling for colonial power and continent
All Countries Democracies
initial income70 -1.466*** (0.268) -1.375*** (0.327)
resource abundance70 -8.225*** (1.758) -9.011*** (1.765)
openness 1.274*** (0.411) 1.263** (0.481)
invest7089 0.518 (0.329) 0.607 (0.418)
rule of law 0.451*** (0.103) 0.480*** (0.119)
change in tot 0.095* (0.051) -0.011 (0.075)
dem_maj -0.706* (0.375) -1.102*** (0.397)
dem_maj_ra 4.617* (2.708) 6.058** (2.880)
non_dem -0.134 (0.534)
non_dem_ra -0.700 (2.954)
col_esp 0.345 (0.465) 0.305 (0.472)
col_uk 0.661* (0.334) 0.876** (0.388)
col_oth 1.013*** (0.297) 0.713** (0.327)
asiae 0.471 (0.538) 0.774 (0.601)
laam -0.305 (0.537) -0.199 (0.531)
africa -0.019 (0.722) 0.920 (0.827)
Constant 10.905*** (2.612) 9.728*** (3.051)
Observations 73 55
Adjusted R-squared 0.783 0.809
Note: Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active population
between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090). See Appendix A.2 for a precise definition of variables. The numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 7: Growth 1970-1990 including the most robust significant determinants of growth
according to Sala-i-Martin (1997). Form of government. All countries included
(1) (2) (3)
initial income70 -2.296*** -2.291*** -2.334***
resource abundance70 -4.591*** -4.570*** -0.569
lifee 0.090*** 0.096*** 0.085***
school enrollment 1.925* 1.895* 1.861*
safrica 0.077 0.228 -0.182
laam -0.361 -0.423 -0.731
civlibb -0.081 -0.003 -0.057
confuc 4.783*** 4.181** 3.988**
muslim 1.616*** 1.571*** 1.247**
rerd -0.002 -0.002 0.000
eqinv 15.083*** 15.485*** 18.746***
mining 3.685 4.082 3.888
sopen 1.652*** 1.684*** 1.422***
ecorg 0.085 0.086 0.053
spain 0.447 0.376 0.683
dem_pres 0.185 0.828
non_dem -0.274 0.382
dem_pres_ra -7.905*
non_dem_ra -5.956*
Constant 13.049*** 12.416*** 13.297***
Observations 73 73 73
Adjusted R-squared 0.746 0.741 0.753
Note: Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active population
between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090). See Appendix A.2 for a precise definition of variables. * Significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 8: Growth 1970-1990 including the most robust significant determinants of growth
according to Sala-i-Martin (1997). Form of government. Only democracies included.
(1) (2) (3)
initial income70 -2.001*** -2.052*** -2.043***
resource abundance70 -3.915* -3.754* -1.332
lifee 0.055 0.062 0.051
school enrollment 2.439 2.247 2.572*
safrica 1.337* 1.465* 1.104
laam -0.008 -0.013 -0.236
civlibb -0.064 -0.076 -0.105
confuc 4.345** 4.100** 3.550**
muslim 1.625** 1.611** 1.514*
rerd -0.009 -0.010* 0.005
eqinv 17.038*** 18.236*** 20.354***
mining 2.316 2.453 1.751
sopen 2.195*** 2.271*** 2.114***
ecorg -0.117 -0.137 -0.262
spain 0.273 0.121 0.473
dem_pres 0.324 0.880*
dem_pres_ra -7.441*
Constant 12.963*** 13.227*** 13.475***
Observations 54 54 54
Adjusted R-squared 0.783 0.782 0.793
Note: Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active population
between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090). See Appendix A.2 for a precise definition of variables. * Significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 9: Growth 1970-1990 including the most robust significant determinants of growth
according to Sala-i-Martin (1997). Electoral Systems.
All Countries Democracies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
initial income70 -2.286*** -2.272*** -2.030*** -1.966***
resource abundance70 -4.568*** -5.283* -3.858* -8.590***
lifee 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.054 0.045
school enrollment 1.884* 1.127 2.339 1.469
safrica 0.193 -0.145 1.363* 0.947
laam -0.418 -0.546 -0.058 -0.033
civlibb 0.011 -0.040 -0.055 -0.215
confuc 4.169** 4.489** 4.195** 4.611***
muslim 1.532*** 1.257** 1.501* 1.431*
rerd -0.002 -0.002 -0.010* -0.008
eqinv 15.081*** 17.611*** 17.300*** 21.067***
mining 4.351 4.528 3.177 0.737
sopen 1.656*** 1.455*** 2.168*** 1.989***
ecorg 0.095 0.096 -0.080 -0.195
spain 0.383 0.469 0.195 0.521
dem_maj -0.133 -0.527 -0.172 -0.809*
non_dem -0.464 -0.106
dem_maj_ra 4.469 9.334**
non_dem_ra -1.042
Constant 12.597*** 13.377*** 13.431*** 15.064***
Observations 73 73 54 54
Adjusted R-squared 0.740 0.744 0.779 0.798
Note: Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active population
between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090). See Appendix A.2 for a precise definition of variables. * Significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 10: Growth 1970-1990. Form of government and electoral system.
(1) (2)
resource abundance70 -1.834 -1.105
(2.691) (3.080)
parl_prop 0.354 0.595
(0.559) (0.545)
pres_maj 0.120 0.303
(0.849) (0.802)
pres_prop 0.340 1.415
(0.498) (0.646)**
parl_prop_ra -3.177 -7.118
(5.795) (5.729)
pres_maj_ra -11.791 -0.966
(9.349) (7.939)
pres_prop_ra -9.077 -11.285
(3.251)*** (5.375)**
Constant 13.439 14.482
(2.039)*** (3.218)***
Observations 55 54
Adjusted R-squared 0.758 0.786
Note: Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active population
between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090). See Appendix A.2 for a precise definition of variables. Column (1)
include the same controls as Table 1 (initial income70, openness, invest7089, rule of law, and change in tot),
whereas column (2) include the same controls as Table 5 (initial income70, lifee, school enrollment, safrica,
laam, civlibb, confuc, muslim, rerd, eqinv, miningm, sopen, ecorg, and spain). * Significant at 10%; ** signifi-
cant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 11: Growth 1990-2000. Form of Government. Only Democracies included
(1) (2) (3)
LGDPEA90 -0.905 -0.913 -1.031
(0.407)** (0.411)** (0.409)**
LINVEST9099 0.075 0.090 0.052
(0.586) (0.595) (0.584)
YEARSOPEN 0.279 0.258 0.319
(0.376) (0.391) (0.385)
RESOURCE ABUNDANCE 80 0.183 0.188 2.913
(2.175) (2.194) (2.639)
RULE OF LAW 1.218 1.190 1.156
(0.390)*** (0.413)*** (0.405)***
PRES -0.116 0.847
(0.513) (0.742)
PRES_RA -8.014
(4.541)*
Constant 8.847 8.954 9.885
(3.678)** (3.740)** (3.706)**
Adjusted R-squared 0.136 0.120 0.154
Observations 61 61 61
Note: Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active population
between 1990 and 2000 (GROWTH9000). See Appendix A.3 for a precise definition of variables. * Significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 12: Growth 1990-2000. Electoral system. Only Democracies included
(1) (2)
LGDPEA90 -0.855 -0.893
(0.435)* (0.428)**
LINVEST9099 0.104 0.126
(0.597) (0.587)
YEARSOPEN 0.259 0.375
(0.383) (0.383)
RESOURCE ABUNDANCE80 0.142 -3.821
(2.196) (1.113)
RULE OF LAW 1.174 1.113
(0.413)*** (0.408)***
MAJ 0.160 -0.828
(0.463) (0.739)
MAJ_RA 7.251
(4.270)*
Constant 8.283 9.050
(4.052)** (4.008)**
Adjusted R-squared 0.136 0.120
Observations 61 61
Note: Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active population
between 1990 and 2000 (GROWTH9000). See Appendix A.3 for a precise definition of variables. * Significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 13: Growth 1990-2000. Electoral system and form of government. Only Democ-
racies included
(1) (2)
LGDPEA90 -1.005 -0.953
(0.473)** (0.499)*
LINVEST9099 -0.003 0.123
(0.620) (0.622)
YEARSOPEN 0.179 0.351
(0.405) (0.403)
RESOURCE ABUNDANCE80 -0.109 -2.910
(2.241) (3.195)
RULE OF LAW 1.355 1.130
(0.487)*** (0.507)**
PARL_PROP -0.451 -0.141
(0.594) (0.924)
PRES_MAJ -0.620 -0.983
(0.813) (1.324)
PRES_PROP -0.190 1.320
(0.643) (0.983)
PARL_PROP_RA -0.682
(6.355)
PRES_MAJ_RA 2.967
(8.550)
PRES_PROP_RA -10.911
(5.294)**
Constant 10.280 9.048
(4.465)** (4.736)*
Adjusted R-squared 0.101 0.142
Observations 61 61
Note: Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active population
between 1990 and 2000 (GROWTH9000). See Appendix A.3 for a precise definition of variables. * Significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table A1a. Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
growth7090 90 1.13 1.87 -3.64 5.77
initial income70 90 8.31 0.90 6.43 9.95
resource abundance70 90 0.13 0.10 0.01 0.54
openness 90 0.37 0.44 0.00 1.00
invest7089 90 2.66 0.70 0.31 3.58
rule of law 73 3.16 2.05 0.00 6.00
change in tot 90 -0.32 2.77 -6.46 7.97
ra 70 per capita 82 75.36 93.85 1.81 445.20
Table A1b. Summary Statistics. Parl. Dem.
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
growth7090 33 2.15 1.44 -1.35 5.77
initial income70 33 8.91 0.74 7.27 9.75
resource abundance70 33 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.37
openness 33 0.73 0.43 0.00 1.00
invest7089 33 2.97 0.57 1.14 3.58
rule of law 32 4.50 1.93 1.00 6.00
change in tot 33 -0.25 0.96 2.75 1.73
Table A1c. Summary Statistics. Pres. Dem.
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
growth7090 25 0.57 1.90 -3.64 5.71
initial income70 25 8.81 0.71 7.17 9.95
resource abundance70 25 0.14 0.11 0.01 0.51
openness 25 0.27 0.36 0.00 1.00
invest7089 25 2.76 0.39 1.80 3.36
rule of law 23 2.39 1.76 0.00 6.00
change in tot 25 -0.71 2.69 -3.61 5.95
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Table A1d. Summary Statistics. Non Democracies
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
growth7090 32 0.52 1.82 -2.40 4.56
initial income 32 7.62 0.68 6.43 9.16
resource abundance 32 0.16 0.11 0.02 0.54
openness 32 0.09 0.24 0.00 1.00
investment 32 2.25 0.83 0.31 3.34
rule of law 18 1.78 1.11 1.00 5.00
change in tot 32 -0.08 3.90 6.46 7.98
Table A1e. Summary Statistics. Maj. Dem.
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
growth7090 22 1.84 1.56 -1.35 5.77
initial income70 22 8.55 0.93 7.17 9.95
resource abundance70 22 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.37
openness 22 0.55 0.46 0.00 1.00
invest7089 22 2.76 0.63 1.14 3.58
rule of law 19 3.68 2.24 1.00 6.00
change in tot 22 -0.55 1.97 -3.18 5.95
Table A1f. Summary Statistics. Prop Dem.
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
growth7090 36 1.24 1.95 -3.64 5.77
initial income70 36 8.78 0.64 7.67 9.89
resource abundance70 36 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.51
openness 36 0.52 0.46 0.00 1.00
invest7089 36 2.95 0.40 1.63 3.52
rule of law 36 3.58 2.05 0.00 6.00
change in tot 36 -0.38 1.89 -3.61 5.37
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Table A.2 Alternative Table 1
Primary export per capita as alternative resource measure
(1) (2) (3)
initial income70 -1.227 -1.282 -1.123
(0.283)*** (0.301)*** (0.283)***
resource abundance per capita -0.006 -0.006 -0.003
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)
openness 2.030 1.670 1.201
(0.498)*** (0.511)*** (0.492)**
invest7089 0.557 0.678 0.909
(0.426) (0.420) (0.395)**
rule of law 0.474 0.420 0.389
(0.135)*** (0.134)*** (0.125)***
change in tot 0.133 0.135 0.127
(0.056)** (0.057)** (0.053)**
dem_pres -0.817 -0.008
(0.392)** (0.450)
non_dem -0.847 -0.088
(0.453)* (0.517)
dem_pres*(ra per capita) -0.013
(0.004)***
non_dem*(ra per capita) -0.011
(0.005)**
Constant 8.265 9.216 7.245
(2.142)*** (2.361)*** (2.249)***
Observations 67 67 67
Adjusted R-squared 0.575 0.596 0.656
Note: Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active population
between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090). See Appendix A.2 for a precise definition of variables. The numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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CHAPTER 4
CORRUPTION AND OIL: EVIDENCE FROM
PANEL DATA
75
76
Corruption and Oil:Evidence
from Panel Data1
Silje Aslaksen
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, N-7491, Trondheim, Norway
silje.aslaksen@svt.ntnu.no
Abstract
The past decade has seen exponential growth in cross-country studies on corruption. Some of
these studies argue that issues of corruption may be particularly relevant in the context of natu-
ral resource abundance, as natural resource exploration is an extremely high rent activity likely to
foster rent-seeking behavior. However, the existing cross-country literature suffers from omitted
variable bias. This paper reexamines the effect of natural resource abundance on corruption using
panel data as well as new measures of resource endowments. I find evidence indicating that both
oil extraction and mineral income is associated with more corruption. This holds when controlling
for country and time fixed effects. The adverse effect of oil on corruption is present both for demo-
cratic and nondemocratic countries, whereas minerals seem to be a problem for corruption only in
nondemocratic regimes.
Keywords: Natural resources, corruption.
JELclassification: Q26; Q32; D73
1. Introduction
Sachs and Warner (1995) made a major contribution when they found a negative asso-
ciation between natural resource abundance and growth in a large cross-country study.
A substantial number of papers since then have considered the natural resource curse
hypothesis from different points of view. Ross (2001) and Collier and Hoeffler (2005)
1Helpful comments from Ragnar Torvik, Jørgen Juel Andersen, Bjarne Strøm and participants at seminars at
the Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, are gratefully acknowledged.
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focus on the negative associations between resource abundance and the stability and qual-
ity of the political system. From a qualitative angle, historians, political scientists, and
economists generally agree that the presence of abundant natural resources (especially
minerals) leads to rent-seeking behavior and corruption, thereby decreasing the quality
of government (e.g. Auty, 2001; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Isham et al., 2005). For
example, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) find that corruption, weak governance,
rent-seeking, plunder, etc. are a problem intrinsic to countries that own natural resources
such as oil and minerals. Isham et al. (2005) argue that the problem is specific to what
they call "point source" resources such as oil, minerals, and plantation crops, while nat-
ural resource exports that are "diffuse" do not seem to have the same consequences. Ac-
cording to Ross (2001), one explanation as to why oil might hinder democracy, is what he
calls the rentier effect. The argument is that, when a government earns significant and di-
rect ”rent” from a natural resource, it hinders the development of representative politics
by removing the need to collect taxes effectively. When governments derive sufficient
revenues from the sale of oil, they are likely to tax their population less heavily, and the
public in turn will be less likely to demand accountability from, and representation in,
their government.
The past decade has seen exponential growth in cross-country studies on corruption.
Issues of corruption may be particularly relevant in the context of natural resource abun-
dance, as natural resource exploration is an extremely high rent activity likely to foster
rent-seeking behavior. Leite and Weidmann (1999) argues that the associated increase
in rent-seeking opportunities may help to explain Sachs and Warner’s (1995) paradoxi-
cal finding of a negative relationship between natural resource abundance and long-run
economic growth. The problem arises from the possible effect of windfall gains on rent-
seeking behavior. Theoretically, the effect of rents on corruption is ambiguous. Higher
rents means that bureaucrats can extract more rents from firms they control, but it also
means that it is more valuable for the public to avoid corruption and, thus, more likely
that the public will try to control the bureaucrats (Ades and Di Tella, 1999). However,
Ades and Di Tella states that there are indeed examples of a positive connection between
rents and corruption:
Consider, for example, the case of Nigeria in the 1970’s. When compared
to other, non-oil-producing countries in the region, like Togo, Nigeria pro-
vides what is almost a natural experiment for the hypothesis that rents cause
corruption. After the oil shock, observers noted that Nigeria’s oil income
created extraordinary opportunities for corruption (1999, p. 982).
An article in The Economist (August 4, 1984) went so far as to observe:2
Oil and corruption go together. Nigeria’s oil account for about 80% of gov-
ernment revenue. The official price of crude increased 17-fold in eight years
from about $2 a barrel in 1973-4 to $34 by the end of 1981. Nigeria went on
construction and importing spree: Parties and party officials grew rich.
More recently, similar claims have been made for a broad group of countries. At the
launch of the Transparency Internationals Corruption Perception Index 2004, Peter Eigen
(Chairman, TI) said the following.
2This quotation is from Ades and Di Tella (1999, p.982).
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As the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index shows, oil-
rich Angola, Azerbaijan, Chad, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan,
Libya, Nigeria, Russia, Sudan, Venezuela and Yemen all have extremely low
scores. In these countries, the oil sector is plagued by revenues vanishing
into the pockets of western oil executives, middlemen and local officials
(International Foreign Press Association, London, October 20, 2004).
He further stated: “In the Middle East and elsewhere, economies have become over-
dependent on oil, and corruption is rifle”. BBC news report on this launch with the
headline “Oil wealth can cause corruption” (October 20, 2004).
Along similar lines Jeffrey D. Sachs state:
[T]he data show that corruption is highest in oil and gas-producing coun-
tries. In general, natural resources like oil, gas, diamonds, and other pre-
cious minerals breed corruption, because governments can live off of their
export earnings without having to compromise with their own societies. The
natural resources are therefore not only a target of corruption but also an
instrument of holding power. Many foreign companies, intent on cashing
in, fuel the pathology of corrupt regimes by peddling in bribes and political
protection (Daily Times, September 25, 2005).
Other minerals also generate substantial rents, and have in similar ways been accused of
fueling corruption. The rents are largely captured by states via export taxes, corporate
taxes, and state-owned enterprises. More than most industries, mining relies on a high
level of public consent to continue its activities because states tend to exercise a signifi-
cant degree of control over access to and exploitation of mineral resources. In the mining
sector, large sums of money flow from mining companies to governments in the form
of royalties, taxation, and other payments. Great discretionary power lies in the hands
of those responsible for collecting and distributing these revenuers, as well as those who
grant the license and monitor the operations at both the permitting and the operation
phase (Collis and Lee, 2001).
In this paper, I examine the validity of the claim that natural resources, like oil and
minerals, increase corruption. This question has been investigated by others (e.g. Sala-
i-Martin and Subramanian 2003; Isham et al., 2005; Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Leite
and Weidmann, 1999). I extend this literature in two ways. First, I use panel data, and
second, I use different measures of resource endowments. Common among the existing
literature is that they use export shares or export data to measure natural resource abun-
dance. Over the past decade, a distinguished body of empirical literature has emerged in
support of arguments that institutional form and quality are deeply embedded in history
and geography3. This work suggests that combinations of climate (disease environment,
rainfall levels, temperature), topography (soil and mineral quality, access to ports), and
labor (degrees of scarcity) in the early colonial period interacted in different places with
the profitability of natural resources. This in turn made it more or less necessary to build
governance institutions geared toward controlling the domestic population by an expatri-
ate minority. Countries where extractive institutions were initially laid down organized
3See, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2003) and Easterly and Levine (2002).
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themselves in ways that reduce the likelihood that over time they would have either more
diverse revenue (export) streams or more open political structures (Isham et al., 2005). If
this is so, one could argue that attempts to measure (natural resource) export structures
and institutional quality (corruption) in the late twentieth century, as is done in most cross
country studies, are merely capturing paths of development laid down many decades ago.
Therefore, in this paper I use natural resource variables that are (at least partly) unrelated
to export structure. In this paper, natural resources are either measured as the unit rent
(price less extraction costs) times the extracted amount (in gross national income) or sim-
ply as the extracted quantity per capita. In addition, this paper uses panel estimation to
deal with the possibility of omitted variables. One concern is that earlier results reflect
the influence of variables not included in the regressions that affect both corruption and
export structure (natural resource abundance). I deal with this by controlling for country
and time fixed effects in panel regressions covering the period 1982-1997 for up to 118
countries. Both cross-country estimation, and panel fixed-effects estimation indicate that
minerals and oil are associated with more corruption in government. The adverse effect
of oil on corruption is present both for democratic and nondemocratic countries, whereas
mineral income seems to be a problem for corruption only in nondemocratic regimes.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on natural re-
source abundance and institutions. Section 3 describes the dataset used and my empirical
strategy. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Natural Resources and Institutional Quality
A number of papers over the past decade have argued that the natural resource environ-
ment influences different aspects of institutional quality. Ross (2001) use pooled time-
series cross-national data from 113 countries between 1971 and 1997 and find that oil
and non-fuel mineral wealth impedes democratization. Jensen and Wantechekon (2004)
present empirical evidence suggesting a robust and negative correlation between the pres-
ence of a sizable natural resource sector and the level of democracy in Africa. They show
that natural resource dependent economies are more likely to be authoritarian, exhibit
higher levels of government spending, are associated with worse governance, and were
more likely to lead to a breakdown in democracy after the third wave of democratic tran-
sitions in the 1990s. Auty and Gelb (2001) likewise concluded that point resources such
as minerals, have a particularly strong association with destabilizing social tension, and
Murshed (2003) suggests that point resources retard democratic and institutional devel-
opment.
Bulte and Damania (2005) find that point resources are typically associated with less
productive social institutions (lower government effectiveness and rule of law scores).
Isham et al. (2005) compute four export indexes (manufactures; diffuse; point source;
coffee and cocoa) to capture countries reliance on different sources of export revenues.
They find that data on classification of export structure, controlling for other potential de-
terminants of governance, shows that point source and coffee and cocoa exporting coun-
tries do poorly across an array of governance indicators, including corruption. Countries
with natural resource exports that are diffuse are not found to have the same strong ef-
fect on governance indicators. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) find that exports
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of fuel, natural gas, ores and minerals have a negative effect on growth via their dele-
terious impact on institutional quality, including corruption. They stress that the natural
resource curse only holds for mineral, and particularly oil, abundance, and not agri-
cultural products and food (all measured by their respective export shares). Leite and
Weidmann (1999) use data on exports of fuel, minerals, agriculture and food products
and find that the extent of corruption depends on natural resource abundance. Fuel and
ores are consistently related to worse scores of corruption, whereas agriculture and food
exports are associated with better scores. Ades and Di Tella (1999) use the proportion of
total exports accounted for by fuels, minerals, and metals as a measure related to rents
for domestic firms. They find that this variable is significantly related to more corruption
for the period 1980-1983. When country and year fixed effects are included, the fuel and
mineral export variable become insignificant. There is also evidence that natural resource
abundance considerably increase the potential of violent civil conflict. For example Col-
lier and Hoeffler (2002) show that natural resources increase the chances of civil conflict.
Civil conflict, of course, is an extreme manifestation of institutional collapse, and this
literature is therefore suggestive of a role for natural resources in affecting institutional
quality more generally.
Although several authors support the view that natural resource abundance is a curse
for institutional quality, there is no absolute consensus. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2006)
challenge the findings of the resource curse, and dispute that abundant resources lead to
bad institutions or slow growth. Their finding is that the chain of causality is opposite
to the traditional view: bad institutions are associated with high scores on the (Sachs
and Warner) resource abundance indicator. Contrary to the result that resource abundant
countries tend to suffer from worse institutions, they find that countries with certain insti-
tutional designs fail to develop significant non-resource sectors and thereby make them-
selves dependent on primary sector extraction. Properly accounting for resource wealth
(as opposed to resource abundance) they find that resources are a blessing for both insti-
tutional and economic development. In addition, Brunnschweiler (2006) challenge the
so-called resource curse. Using a new measure of resource endowment, natural capital
per capita, she finds no evidence of a negative effect of natural resources on institutional
quality.
3. Data and Econometric Specification
A common definition of public corruption is the misuse of public office for private gain.
Corruption defined this way would capture, for example, the sale of government prop-
erty by government officials, bribery and embezzlement of government funds (Svensson,
2005). Corruption is not the same as rent-seeking, although the terms are often used in-
terchangeably. Measuring corruption across countries is a difficult task, both because of
the secretive nature of corruption because of and the variety of forms it takes. No defini-
tion of corruption is completely clear-cut. Three types of corruption measures have been
exploited in the literature. The first type, used initially by Knack and Keefer (1995) and
Mauro (1995), is based on indicators of corruption assembled by private risk-assessment
firms. Of these, the corruption indicator published in the International Country Risk
Guide has become the most popular, because of better coverage across time and coun-
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tries (Svensson, 2005). The second type is averages of ratings reported by a number of
perception-based sources. The Corruption Perception Index produced by Transparency
International is within this set. Third, Kaufmann et al. (2003) derive a complementary
measure, Control of Corruption, based on a larger set of sources. They have a broader
definition of corruption and include most cross-country indices reporting rankings of
countries on some aspect of corruption. However, because corruption reflects an under-
lying institutional framework, different forms of corruption are likely to be correlated4.
The emphasis in this paper is on public corruption. My measure of corruption (cor-
ruption in government) is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index,
from the IRIS-3 dataset. This index has been used by Ades and Di Tella (1999), Pers-
son et al. (2003), Leite and Weidmann (1999), and Svensson (2005) among others. It
is released by Political Risk Services, a private think tank specializing in international
political and economic country-risk assessment. The IRIS dataset was originally con-
structed in 1993 by Steve Knack and Philip Keefer for the IRIS Center at the University
of Maryland, based on data obtained from the International Country Risk Guide. Knack
produced subsequent issues of the data for an ongoing series of working papers from the
IRIS Center. The IRIS-3 dataset contains data for the period 1982-1997. The index is
based on the opinion of a pool of country analysts. Corruption in Government ranges
in value from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating "better" ratings. Lower scores indi-
cate "high government officials are likely to demand special payments" and that "illegal
payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government" in the form of
"bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment,
police protection, or loans".
The data on natural resources are from the World Development Indicators and the
World Bank Adjusted Net Savings dataset (also called the genuine savings dataset). Min-
eral rent, energy rent, and oil quantity are from the World Bank’s dataset on genuine sav-
ings (adjusted net savings). The dataset represents a comprehensive attempt to estimate
the value of natural resource extraction. It covers 149 countries, both developed and de-
veloping, over the period 1970-2004. Energy rent consists of oil, gas and coal, whereas
Mineral rent encompasses bauxite, copper, iron ore, lead, nickel, phosphate rock, tin,
zinc, gold and silver. Both mineral rent and energy rent are measured as a percentage
of Gross National Income (GNI). The value of natural resource extraction is generally
computed as unit rent, that is price minus average extraction cost, times the amount of
the resource extracted. For minerals, the unit rent is computed as the world price of the
resource minus mining, milling, benefication, melting and transportation to port costs
minus a normal return to capital. For oil, gas and coal, the unit rent is the world price mi-
nus lifting costs. For some resources, such as natural gas, where, strictly speaking, there
is no single world price, a shadow world price is computed as the average free-on-board
price from several points of export.
Compared with the commonly used primary exports variable the data have a number
of advantages. First, rents from production represent a more comprehensive measure of
the relative economic importance of natural resources than export, for judging arguments
about state capacity. Natural resources can be harmful to state capacity because of the
4The correlation between Control of Corruption (from 2002) and the Corruption Perceptions Index (from
2003) is 0.97, and the correlation between Control of Corruption or the Corruption Perceptions and the corrup-
tion scores from the International Country Risk Guide (from 2001) is 0.75 (Svensson, 2005).
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enormous rents they generate, so it might be better to measure these rents directly, rather
than indirectly with exports data. Second, the data are explicitly focused on a clear set of
natural resources (de Soysa and Neumayer, 2005).
Oil quantity is measured as the oil production volume (in metric tons) per capita. The
oil quantity variable has two advantages compared with the energy rent variable. First, it
is not directly related to GDP and hence is less likely to be subject to the reverse causality
of corruption causing changes in gross domestic product. Second, in a world with big
changes in the oil price, the value of resource extraction might be a poor measure of
the activity in the resource sector. An expanding resource sector, new discoveries, new
participants entering the sector and new licenses being issued, might be important when
determining corruption. The oil quantity variable, in its original form, only contains
values for oil-extracting countries. Countries that do not produce oil have missing values
for this variables. Therefore, for some countries it is unclear whether oil quantity is zero
or actually missing. I follow two different approaches to deal with this potential problem.
First, I replace the missing value with zero, if the energy rent variable is not missing. By
definition the energy rent variable consists of oil, gas and coal, and if this variable is not
missing, then I interpret that oil quantity also is not missing and equal to zero. Second,
in some specifications I include the oil quantity variable in its original form, and hence
only include countries that do extract oil.
The third category of natural resources, agriculture, is from the World Development
Indicators. Agriculture represent agriculture, value added (% of GDP). Agriculture value
added corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5, and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as
well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of
a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degra-
dation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3.
Earlier empirical work has identified a number of economic variables correlated with
corruption. To take account of economic development, I consider the logarithm of GDP
per capita, lgdp. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear popula-
tion. Data are in constant 2000 U.S. dollars and obtained from the World Development
Indicators.
Restricted market and political competition has been suggested to influence corrup-
tion (e.g. Djankov et al., 2002; Svensson, 2005; Leite and Weidmann, 1999). Earlier lit-
erature has suggested that trade restrictions generate rents and rent-seeking activities, e.g.
attempts to evade tariffs, efforts at premium seeking when agents compete for premium-
fetching licenses, revenue seeking when agents try to appropriate a share of revenues
from import restrictions, and tariff seeking when agents lobby for protectionist tariffs
(Leite and Weidmann, 1999). Thus, the degree of openness to foreign trade should be
a factor in determining the level of rent-seeking activities, or the extent of corruption.
Variables that capture restrictions in the marketplace include openness to external com-
petition from imports (Ades and Di Tella, 1999) and the extent of regulation of entry
of start-up firms (Djankov et al., 2002). I include two measures of openness, trade and
import. Trade is defined as the sum of exports and imports, and import is the value of
all goods and other market services received from the rest of the world, both are mea-
sured as percentage of GDP. To account for the extent of regulation of entry, I include
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the number of business days it takes to obtain legal status (days to obtain legal status).
This is a measure of the time it takes to obtain legal status to operate a firm in 1999, in
business days (a week has five business days and a month has 22) (the data are taken from
Djankov et al., 2002)5. On the political side, a free press provides greater information
than a government-controlled press to voters on government and public sector misbehav-
ior, including corruption (Besley and Burgess, 2002). To account for press freedom, I
include the freedom of media index (freedom of media). The freedom of media index is
the score of four criteria "Laws and regulations that influence media content”, “Political
pressures and controls on media content”, Economic influence over media content”, and
“Repressive actions" for print and broadcast media. Higher scores indicate less press
freedom (data are from Freedom House). Svensson (2005) shows that corrupt countries
have significantly lower levels of human capital stock, proxied by years of schooling of
the total population older than 25 years. To take account of human capital, I consider
years of schooling of the total population older 25 years in 1985 (schooling). Data on
years of schooling are from Barro and Lee (2000). Swamy et al. (2001) show, using
cross-country data, that corruption is less severe where women hold a larger share of
parliamentary seats and senior positions in the government bureaucracy, and comprise
a larger share of the labor force. To control for the gender effect, I include the female
labour force participation rate (female participation rate). Data on female labour force
participation are from Neumayer (2005).
Democratic countries might have better systems of checks and balances to fight cor-
ruption and the misuse of power. Moreover, in democratic countries, voters can hold
their elected representatives accountable at the polls and punish corruption and misbe-
havior of their representatives. In nondemocratic countries, this is not the case. The
nature and determinant of corruption might therefore be different in democracies and
non-democracies. To capture the possibility that corruption might be determined differ-
ently in democracies and nondemocracies, I include a variable that indicates whether the
country is democratic (dem). The democracy variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
country was considered democratic in 1982 (the first year in my panel data), and 0 other-
wise. Countries are considered democratic if the Polity score of democracy was strictly
positive in 19826. The score of democracy is computed by subtracting the institutional
autocracy score from the institutional democracy score. Data are taken from the Polity
IV Project. In some specifications I include the score of democracy (PolityIV), instead
of a binary variable to account for the level of democracy. Ades and Di Tella (1999) ar-
gue that the amount of monitoring by civil society might be relevant for corruption. One
variable that captures the ability of civil society to judge government performance in a
country is the index of political rights (Political Rights). This variable is published by
Freedom House and measures the respect for political rights that facilitate the function-
ing of independent political parties. Political rights enable people to participate freely in
the political process, including through the right to vote, compete for public office, and
elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable
to the electorate. The index varies from 1 to 7, with low values associated with greater
5Svensson (2005) shows that the (log of) number of business days to obtain legal status is positively corre-
lated with corruption.
6This definition is used by Persson and Tabellini (2003) among others. The Polity IV Data can be obtained
from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm.
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political rights.
I follow two different strategies in order to investigate the correlation between natural
resources and corruption. I start out with a simple OLS specification of the following
form:
yi = α+ βxli + ui (1)
Countries are indicated by i; y is the average corruption rate between 1982 and 1997;
x’ is a vector of explanatory variables; and β is the corresponding vector of coefficients
to be estimated. Next, I formulate a fixed-effects panel data model. All unobserved
time-invariant influences captured by the country fixed effects, and common cycles are
controlled for by time fixed effects.
yit = α+ βxit + µi + ηt + uit (2)
Again countries are indicated by i; time is indicated by t; y is corruption; x’ is a vector
of explanatory variables; β is the corresponding vector of coefficients to be estimated; µ
represent individual country effects, capturing cultural and other time-invariant factors; η
and represent time fixed effects. The fixed-effects estimator is based on the time variation
within each cross-sectional unit only. Exploiting the time variation in the data provides
additional information, because it allows me to relax the assumption of conditional in-
dependence underlying the cross-sectional estimates. Specifically, (non time-varying)
omitted variables jointly determining corruption levels and the rate of natural resource
extraction are unlikely to cause problems in this panel. Although time variation does
not guarantee exogeneity, the fixed-effects estimation provides useful information (and a
check on the cross-section estimation) regarding the correlation between corruption and
natural resources. The panel estimation allows me to determine if the correlation between
of corruption and natural resources hold when controlling for country and year fixed ef-
fects, or if they are primarily because of omitted variables. For some of the variables
described above, there is no variation across time, and hence they are only included in
the cross-country estimation.
4. Results
My first regression results are reported in Table 1, which presents the results using the
average corruption index between 1982 and 1997 as the dependent variable, with a high
score, on a 0-6 scale, indicating less corruption.
Column (1) reports the correlation between corruption and the three measures of
natural resource income. All three measures of natural resource income are associated
with more corruption. When economic controls (lgdp) and openness variables (import,
trade) are included, agriculture is no longer statistically significant. Richer countries
have lower corruption, consistent with the theories of corruption that argue that insti-
tutional quality is shaped by economic factors. Neither of the two measures of trade
openness (import and trade) is significantly related to corruption, indicating that there
is no evidence that regulations on foreign trade generate corruption. Column 4 shows
that democratic countries are less corrupt, but including a dummy variable for democ-
racy does not significantly change any of the other parameter estimates. Less freedom of
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media is associated with more corruption (column (5)) and higher schooling is associated
with less corruption (column (6)). A higher female participation rate is associated with
less corruption in government (column (7)) whereas days to obtain legal status is not
statistically significant (column (8)). Energy rent is statistically significant and related
to worse corruption scores in column (1) to (7). In column (8), the effect is no longer
statistically significant, but this is probably because of the drop in the number of coun-
tries in this specification. Columns (1) to (7) indicate that an increase in energy rent by
one standard deviation (7.46) is associated with a reduction in the corruption score of
about 0.25 to 0.52, which correspond to a worsening of the corruption index of about
19.08 to 39.69 percent of a standard deviation. In the full model specification, including
all variables, the only two variables that remain statistically significant are mineral rent
and the female participation rate. An increase in mineral rent by one standard deviation
(3.29), is associated with a reduction in the corruption score of about 0.22 to 0.41, which
correspond to a worsening of the corruption index of about 16.78 to 31.30 percent of a
standard deviation.
As discussed earlier, cross-country evidence, such as that of Table 1 and in the earlier
literature on natural resources and corruption, has a number of shortcomings. It may
be problematic to base inference on variation between countries if cross-section hetero-
geneity is large, as is clearly the case in this setting. Panel data have both time series
and cross-sectional variation, unlike cross-section data. There are a number of benefits
of panel data. Because there are multiple observations per year, one can remove year
fixed effects. Thus, any unobserved shocks that affect the entire world (e.g., changes in
oil price or technology) can be controlled for. Similarly, country fixed effects can be in-
cluded in the analysis so that comparisons are not made across countries, but only using
within-country deviations over time. Again, this allows one to control for differences
across countries that are not easily quantified. Norway and the United Arab Emirates are
clearly very different countries, and they differ along so many dimensions that it is likely
to be very difficult to capture the differences fully using typical covariates. With panel
data, country fixed effects eliminate anything consistent about a country over time, only
time-varying characteristics need to be taken into account. Although there is nothing
explicitly causal about panel data estimates, by eliminating these important sources of
omitted variables, one may obtain coefficients that come closer to representing a causal
impact.
Panel data also have weaknesses. By including country and year fixed effects, only
the short-term relationship between the variables will be reflected in the parameter esti-
mates. If there is a high degree of correlation in variables over time, there will be little
remaining variation with which to identify the coefficients. Table 2 displays the summary
statistics for the panel data. As seen from Table 2, there is more variation between coun-
tries than within countries. Corruption in government ranges from 0 to 6. The within
standard deviation of corruption is about 25 percent of the overall standard deviation in
corruption. The energy rent variable varies between 0 and 53.847 (the maximum level
of 53.857 is for Qatar, 1984). The within standard deviation of energy rent is about one-
third of the overall standard deviation in energy rent. The mineral rent variable varies
between 0 and 57.999 (the maximum level of 57.999 is for Namibia, 1988). The within
standard deviation of mineral rent is about 50 percent of the overall standard deviation in
mineral rent. The oil quantity variable varies between 0 and 59.804 (the maximum level
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of 59.804 is for Qatar, 1984). The within standard deviation of oil quantity is about 25
percent of the overall standard deviation in oil quantity. The agriculture variable varies
between 0.116 and 69.325 (the maximum level of 69.325 is for Somalia, 1988). The
within standard deviation of agriculture is about 25 percent of the overall standard devi-
ation in agriculture.
Using panel data, inference can be based on variation across countries and/or vari-
ation within countries. There are good arguments for relying primarily on the latter.
Inherent features of different countries that affect corruption in government, which are
not captured in any of the included regressors yield biased estimates. Inference based on
within country variation is less likely to be subject to omitted variable bias. The problem
with the within country approach is that resource environment vary considerably more
across countries than within countries. Thus basing inference purely on within country
variation removes a lot of the variation in the data. Statistically, fixed effects are always
a reasonable thing to do with panel data. Random effects estimation might be more
efficient, and therefore random effects is preferable if it is statistically justifiable to do
so7.
Using my unbalanced panel data, I am able to include more countries than the cross-
country estimation. Column (1) of Table 3 reproduces the cross-country results with
period averages for the same countries that where included in the baseline estimation
of Table 1. I include this specification to make sure that any change in results from
the cross-country estimation is not primarily because of the inclusion of more countries.
Column (2) reports the fixed effect results on corruption in government, including only
natural resources for the same countries that where included in the baseline specification
of Table 1. As seen from column (2) onlymineral rent is statistically significant. Column
(3) repeats the specification of column (2), but includes all countries with non-missing
observations for at least two years. As seen from column (3) the results do not change
considerably when including all countries. Columns (4) and (5) indicate that the open-
ness variables and income level are not associated with less corruption in government.
Columns (6) and (7) include controls for the level of democracy and political rights.
Not surprisingly, a higher democracy score is associated with better ratings of corrup-
tion. When period fixed effects are included, the only variable that remains statistically
significant is mineral rent (Column (8)). I have also tried to estimate the model with a
random-effects estimator (result not shown). Results on the resource environment are
generally rather similar to the fixed-effects model, but the Hausman test results rejects
the random-effects assumption.
In all specifications in Table 3, mineral rent is statistically significantly correlated
with corruption scores. A one (within country) standard deviation increase in mineral
rent (2.03) corresponds to an reduction of the corruption score of about 0.05, which is
equivalent to a worsening of the corruption index of about 8.33 percent of a (within coun-
try) standard deviation. Surprisingly, energy rent is not statistically significant in any of
the specifications of Table 3. What does this mean? Is energy production really unrelated
to corruption within countries, or is it the case that the value of energy production in GNI
is a poor measure for determining the effect on corruption. In real terms, the oil price
drastically decreased in the period 1982-1997, with the exception of a price peak in 1991
7Random effects (RE) are only displayed when the Hausman test results does not reject the random-effect
assumption
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Figure 1: Crude Oil Price per Barrel 1980 - 2000
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with the invasion of Kuwait. Figure 1 displays the crude oil prices per barrel from 1980
to 2000 in 2005 U.S. dollars8.
A lot of the within country variation in energy rent is because of the change in the
oil price in this period, and the trend is quite similar for all countries that produce oil.
Revenues from energy production is therefore not a good proxy for energy production.
With the oil price varying so much in this period, many countries will be measured to
be less energy intensive, even if production has increased quite a lot in this period. It is
plausible that the size of the oil sector, the number of participants in the energy sector,
and the extracted quantity, is important when determining the effect on corruption. It
seems reasonable that a falling oil price will not necessarily reduce corruption, if the size
of the sector is unchanged or increasing. I therefore include the quantity of oil extracted
per capita instead of energy rent. The results are displayed in Table 4.
Contrary to the energy rent variable, oil quantity per capita is associated with more
corruption in government. A one (within country) standard deviation increase in oil
quantity (1.78) corresponds to an worsening of the corruption score of about 0.05, which
is equivalent to about 8.33 percent of a (within country) standard deviation. The results
for the other variables are similar to the results in Table 3. Again the Hausman test results
rejects the random-effect assumption (results not shown). I have deleted one country at
8The oil price data are from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006.
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/publications/energy_reviews_2006/
STAGING/local_assets/downloads/spreadsheets/statistical_review_full_report_workbook_2006.xls
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Table 4: Panel Data Estimates, Oil Quantity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
oil quantity -0.025 -0.025 -0.031 -0.031
(0.010)** (0.010)** (0.011)*** (0.011)***
mineral -0.029 -0.029 -0.027 -0.027
(0.015)* (0.015)** (0.016)* (0.016)*
agriculture -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
lgdp 0.031 0.024 -0.073 -0.076
(0.328) (0.326) (0.345) (0.344)
import 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.004)
trade 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
polity IV 0.033 0.033 0.018 0.018
(0.014)** (0.014)** (0.014) (0.014)
political rights 0.057 0.056 0.024 0.024
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043)
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes
r2_w 0.039 0.039 0.070 0.070
r2_o 0.278 0.267 0.015 0.013
Countries 107 107 107 107
Observations 1502 1502 1502 1502
Note: Fixed effects (FE) estimates. Dependent variable is yearly CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT”. A
constant term is included in all specifications (not reported). Huber robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Regression disturbance terms are clustered at the country level. The symbols ***, ** , and * denote significant
at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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a time using the full model specification of column (3) to make sure that the results
are not driven by one single country. The lowest absolute value of the estimated effect
of oil quantity is -0.0236 (when dropping Gabon) and the highest absolute value of the
estimated effect of oil quantity on corruption is -0.0396 (when dropping Norway).
As mentioned earlier, there are reasons to believe that the determinant of corruption
might be different in democracies and nondemocracies. To capture the possibility that
corruption might be determined differently in democracies an non-democracies, I reesti-
mate the model separately for non democratic countries and countries at different levels
of democracy. Countries are classified as nondemocratic if the Polity score was zero or
negative in 1982, countries are classified as having a medium level of democracy if the
Polity score was strictly positive but lower that the maximum level of 10 in 1982, and
countries are classified as having a high level of democracy if the Polity score was at the
maximum level of 10 in 1982. The results are displayed in Table 59.
Among nondemocratic countries, neither income level, the openness variables or the
political rights variable are statistically significant (column (1) and (2)). In nondemo-
cratic countries, both oil quantity and mineral rent are associated with more corruption
in government. Among countries at medium level of democracy, the only variables that
are statistically significant are oil quantity and log of GDP per capita (columns (3) and
(4)). The effect of oil quantity on corruption in government is larger in nondemocratic
countries than in countries at a medium level of democracy. Among countries at high
levels of democracy, none of the natural resource variables are statistically significant
(columns (5) and (6)). Among countries at high levels of democracy, worse scores for
political rights are associated with more corruption in government (significant at the 5%
level).
Not all countries extract oil. As mentioned earlier the oil quantity variable, in its
original form, only contains values for oil-producing countries. Up to this point, all
countries have been included in the regression10. In Table 6, I include only oil extracting
countries. Columns (1) and (2) indicate that, within countries that extract oil, a higher
extraction quantity of oil is associated with more corruption in government. The results
regarding oil quantity are similar to those obtained when including all countries.
One potential critique might be that oil quantity is determined by unobserved vari-
ables that correlate with corruption in government. One potential solution is to in-
clude only countries that where members of the Organization of the Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC). OPEC is a permanent, intergovernmental organization, created
at the Baghdad Conference 1960, by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.
The five founding members were later joined by eight other members: Qatar (1961);
Indonesia (1962); Socialist Peoples Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1962); United Arab Emi-
rates (1967); Algeria (1969); Nigeria (1971); Ecuador (1973 1992) and Gabon (1975
1994). OPEC’s objective is to coordinate and unify petroleum policies among mem-
ber countries. OPEC member countries coordinate their oil production policies to help
stabilize the oil market and to help oil producers achieve a reasonable rate of return on
their investments. The ministers of energy and hydrocarbon affairs meet twice a year to
review the status of the international oil market and examine forecasts for the future to
9Table A2 displays the descriptive statistics separately for these three groups of countries.
10Missing values for oil quantity have been replaced by zero if the Energy rent variable is not missing (see
section 3).
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Table 6: Oil Extracting Countries
All Oil Extraction Countries OPEC members
(1) (2) (3)
oil quantity -0.0236 -0.0291 -0.0493
(0.0113)** (0.0119)** (0.0149)**
Year fixed effect No Yes No
r2_w 0.062 0.094 0.332
r2_o 0.007 0.007 0.157
Countries 69 69 9
Observations 964 964 117
Note: Fixed effects (FE) estimates. Dependent variable is yearly CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT”. A
constant term, mineral rent, lgdp, import, polity IV and political rights are included in all specifications (not
reported). Huber robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regression disturbance terms are clustered at the
country level. The symbols ***, ** , and * denote significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
agree on appropriate actions that will promote stability in the oil market (OPEC‘s official
homepage, http://www.opec.org.). One could argue that oil production within individual
OPEC member countries is less endogenous to omitted variables than oil production in
other countries. At least in theory, individual OPEC members are restricted by quotas.
Although OPEC member countries have been cheating on their quotas, the quotas are
subject to some external (to the individual country) control. Column (3) includes only
countries that where members of OPEC during the whole period.
For OPEC countries, one could push the exogeneity issue one step further. OPEC’s
Annual Statistical Bulleting release crude oil ceiling allocations for OPEC members (in
thousands of barrels per day), together with actual crude oil production (in thousands of
barrels per day). Ceiling allocation is a valid instrument for oil quantity (oil production)
if it is correlated with oil quantity (oil production) but uncorrelated with corruption in
government: ceiling allocation should affect corruption in government only through ac-
tual oil quantity (oil production). In Table 7, variation in ceiling allocation, as captured
in current and lagged values, is used as an instrument for oil quantity (oil production)
in the first stage, with other country characteristics controlled for. Again, oil quantity
is associated with more corruption in government. Current values of ceiling allocation
are statistically significantly correlated with oil production, and according to the Sargan
tests, we cannot reject that the instruments are uncorrelated with the errors, implying the
validity of the instruments.
Could the results obtained so far be driven by atypically high or low values in any
one single year? I repeat the regressions using three-year averages of the dependent and
all independent variables for the period 1983-1997 to reduce the impact of atypically
high or low rates in any one single year. Because inference is based on within country
variation, countries are dropped if there is less than two observations for that specific
country (Czech Republic, Oman, Slovakia, Korea, Mongolia, and Sudan are dropped in
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Table 8). The results are displayed in Table 8.
In the random-effects model, oil quantity, mineral rent, income level and the female
participation rate are statistically significant with expected signs. When period fixed ef-
fects are not included, the mineral rent variable and the female participation rate variable
are statistically significant at 10% (columns (2) and (3)), but these variables become sta-
tistically insignificant when period fixed effects are included (columns (4) and (5)). In
the full model specification, with country and year fixed effects included (columns (4)
and (5)), the only variable that is statistically significant is oil quantity. These results in-
dicate that at least the effect of oil on corruption is not driven by atypically high values in
any one single year. Columns (6) and (7) only includes countries that extract oil. Within
countries that extract oil, higher extraction quantities are associated with worse scores of
corruption in government (significant at the10% percent level).
5. Conclusion
This paper has presented new empirical results on natural resource abundance and cor-
ruption. The main lesson of the data is that corruption is affected by the resource envi-
ronment. Evidence from a cross section of countries shows that both oil extraction and
mineral income are associated with more corruption in government, whereas agricultural
production is not significantly related to corruption. In both the cross-section analysis
and controlling for country and time fixed effects, I find that, other things equal, oil and
minerals are associated with more corruption. The adverse effect of oil on corruption is
present both for countries at medium levels of democracy and nondemocratic countries,
whereas minerals are a problem only in nondemocratic regimes. Within countries at the
highest level of democracy, corruption in government is unaffected by the resource en-
vironment. As pointed out by Isham et al. (2005) these results might be stultifying for
policymakers. It is hard to imagine how a policymaker interested in fighting corruption
can change what is identified here as one possible cause of high corruption. Optimistic
and constructive proposals can be found, however, such as those made by The Economist
(2003) and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), among others. They suggest making
publicly available all revenues and expenditures associated with natural resource rents.
This is a necessary first step towards a more accountable system for the management of
revenues in resource-rich countries.
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A.1 Variable Description
agriculture
Represent agriculture, value added (% of GDP). Agriculture value added corresponds to
ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of
crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding
up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making de-
ductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural re-
sources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC), revision 3.
Source: World Development Indicators.
ceiling allocation
Crude oil ceiling allocations for OPEC members, in hundred thousand barrels per day.
If there is more than one observation of ceiling allocation per year, I use the ceiling
allocation that has applied for the longest time during that year.
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulleting 2005.
corruption in government
Corruption index. The index is based on the opinion of a pool of country analysts. Cor-
ruption in Government range in value from 0-6, with higher values indicating "better"
ratings. Lower scores indicate "high government officials are likely to demand special
payments" and that "illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of
government" in the form of "bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange
controls, tax assessment, police protection, or loans".
Source: International Country Risk Guide.
days to obtain legal status
A measure of the time it takes to obtain legal status to operate a firm, in business days (a
week has five business days and a month has 22).
Source: Djankov et al., 2002
dem
Democracy variable. The democracy variable is a binary variable equal to one if the
country was considered democratic in 1982, and zero otherwise. Countries are consid-
ered democratic if the Polity score of democracy was strictly positive in 1982.
energy rent
The value of oil, gas and coal extraction as percentage of Gross National Income (GNI).
The value of natural resource extraction is generally computed as unit rent, that is price
minus average extraction cost, times the amount of resource extracted. For oil, gas and
coal, the unit rent is the world price minus lifting costs. For some resources, such as
natural gas, where, strictly speaking, there is no single world price, a shadow world price
is computed as the average free-on-board price from several points of export.
Source: World Development Indicators.
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female participation rate
Female labour force participation rate.
Source: Neumayer (2005).
import
The value of all goods and other market services received from the rest of the world,
measured as percentage of GDP.
Source: World Development Indicators.
lgdp
The logarithm of GDP per capita. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by
midyear population. Data are in constant 2000 U.S. dollars.
Source: World Development Indicators.
mineral rent
The value of bauxite, copper, iron ore, lead, nickel, phosphate rock, tin, zinc, gold and
silver extraction as percentage of Gross National Income (GNI). The value of natural
resource extraction is generally computed as unit rent, that is price minus average extrac-
tion cost, times the amount of resource extracted. For minerals, the unit rent is computed
as the world price of the resource minus mining, milling, benefication, melting and trans-
portation to port costs minus a normal return to capital.
Source: World Development Indicators.
oil production
Crude oil production, in hundred thousand Barrels per day.
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulleting 2005.
http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%20Bulletin/interactive/FileZ/Main.htm
oil quantity
Oil production volume (in metric tons) per capita. Missing values have been replace with
zero, if the energy rent variable is non missing. By definition the energy rent variable
consists of oil, gas and coal, and if this variable is non missing, then I interpret that oil
quantity also is non missing but zero.
Source: Oil production volume is from World Bank’s data set on genuine savings (ad-
justed net savings), population is from World Development Indicators.
political rights
Index of political rights. The index measures the respect for political rights that facilitate
the functioning of independent political parties. Political rights enable people to partici-
pate freely in the political process, including through the right to vote, compete for public
office, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are
accountable to the electorate. The index varies from 1 to 7, with low values associated
with more political rights.
Source: Freedom House.
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polityIV
Score of democracy. The score of democracy is computed by subtracting the institutional
autocracy score from the institutional democracy score.
Source: The Polity IV Project.
press freedom
Freedom of media index. The freedom of media index is the score of four criteria "Laws
and regulations that influence media content," "Political pressures and controls on media
content," "Economic influence over media content," "Repressive actions" for print and
broadcast media. Higher scores indicate less press freedom.
Source: Freedom House.
schooling
Average years of schooling of the total population aged over 25 in 1985.
Source: Barro and Lee (2000).
trade
The sum of exports and imports, measured as percentage of GDP.
Source: World Development Indicators.
104
Table A.1 Summary Statistics, Cross-Country Data
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
corruption in government 128 3.386 1.308 0.119 6
mineral rent 100 1.221 3.292 0 18.532
energy rent 100 2.200 7.458 0 52.269
agriculture 89 21.756 15.097 0.260 62.460
import 95 27.588 17.335 2.603 95.764
trade 95 53.794 33.698 5.022 169.366
female participation rate 125 31.523 12.171 5.033 52.200
schooling 94 5.004 2.784 0.423 11.711
press freedom 124 45.282 23.810 7 99
days to obtain legal status 76 47.987 32.219 2 152
lgdp 96 7.590 1.538 4.785 10.620
dem 115 0.391 0.490 0 1
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Oil production volume (inmetric tons)∗crude oil price (in currentUSD)
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